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I. A CRISIS OF SELF-GOVERNMENT
In supporting Brexit, Michael Gove declared “people in this country
have had enough of experts,” a remark that spurred derision among the
intelligentsia.1  But social experts really do have an uninspiring track record.2 
Despite the tremendous resources that have been poured into the economic
and social sciences and the extensive use of their models by policy makers, 
the level of predictive power required to guide social systems along preferred
paths is, I shall argue, increasingly difficult and often impossible.  If we
understand self-governance as something like the ability of the governor 
to guide society along a preferred path—be it toward ideal justice, the
maximization of welfare, national community, or socialism—we have 
constructed a social world that is too complex for self-governance of any
sort, democratic or not.
1. Henry Mance, Britain Has Had Enough of Experts, Says Gove, FIN. TIMES (June
3, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/3be49734-29cb-11e6-83e4-abc22d5d108c [https://
perma.cc/L5W8-Z4LP].  For an expert reply, see John Llewellyn, Forecasters Use Their
Expertise to Help Us Shape Our Daily Lives, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.
ft.com/content/794fd870-be24-11e6-8b45-b8b81dd5d080 [https://perma.cc/87PY-2NGH].
2. See generally DAVID M.LEVY&SANDRA J.PEART,ESCAPE FROM DEMOCRACY: THE
ROLE OF EXPERTS AND THE PUBLIC IN ECONOMIC POLICY (2017). As Edward Tenner
concludes his review of public policy, “What is almost a constant, though, is that the real 
benefits usually are not the ones we expected, and the real perils are not the ones we
feared.”  EDWARD TENNER, WHY THINGS BITE BACK: TECHNOLOGY AND THE REVENGE OF
UNINTENDED 272 (1996); Gerald F. Gaus, Social Complexity and Evolved Moral Principles, in
LIBERALISM, CONSERVATISM, AND HAYEK’S IDEA OF SPONTANEOUS ORDER 149, 151 (Louis
Hunt & Peter McNamara eds., 2007).  See generally PHILIP E. TETLOCK, EXPERT POLITICAL 
JUDGMENT: HOW GOOD IS IT? HOW CAN WE KNOW? (2005).  The recent turn to empirical
economics, while in many ways welcomed, has not been inspiring: according to a recent
survey, the credibility of economics research is something between modest and low.  John 
Ioannidis & Chris Doucouliagos, What’s to Know About the Credibility of Empirical 
Economics?, 27 J. ECON. SURVEYS 997, 997–98 (2013).  On the disappointing predictive
power of models in political science, see James Johnson, Formal Models in Political Science:
Conceptual, Not Empirical, 81 J. POL., at e6, e6–7 (2018). 
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Most find this almost impossible to believe.3  Our intuitions and folk
causal reasoning lead us to believe that of course we can control our social 
world, and of course we can reform it to conform to our ideals and 
collective aspirations.4  In the grips of this certainty, in the face of each
failed attempt at system self-governance we go back to the drawing board and 
try again.  Sometimes we see some positive effects, and this increases our 
conviction that we can control our social world after all.  But ultimately we 
are disappointed, and we begin to question whether the problem is perhaps in 
our democratic system of self-governance.5 Maybe it is because democracy
allows the idiots a say.  Surely if the experts were empowered or if voters 
had to demonstrate expertise, then we could effectively control our social 
world.  I shall disagree.  The crisis facing democratic self-government is first 
and foremost a crisis of self-governance, not of democracy. 
Section II reviews the nature of complex systems and why our contemporary
social and economic order qualifies as technically complexindeed, 
increasingly so—and why explicit overall, directed reform of our social
world is hopeless.  But hope is not easily abandoned: Section III critically
looks at two continuing sources of hope. Section IV then turns to a critical
issue: If not by central direction, how do such complex systems achieve
orderliness and functionality? Section V turns to the heart of the matter:
is democratic self-governance viable in our increasingly complex systems— 
or, more subtly, what form of self-governance seems the most viable?
Section VI argues that effective self-governance is not a freestanding exercise 
of a general will but must be embedded in the deontic principles of a
liberal order. 
II. COMPLEX SOCIAL SYSTEMS
A. Complexity and Rules
Complexity can be analyzed in different ways; what a physicist considers
a complex system may be rather different than what an economist has in
3. See M. MITCHELL WALDROP, COMPLEXITY: THE EMERGING SCIENCE AT THE EDGE 
OF ORDER AND CHAOS 136–43 (1992).
4. For an important and engaging analysis, see generally NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB,
FOOLED BY RANDOMNESS: THE HIDDEN ROLE OF CHANCE IN LIFE AND IN THE MARKETS chs. 
4 & 14 (2d ed. 2004). 
5. This, of course, is the theme of Hayek’s unjustly disparaged book.  See generally
FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM WITH THE INTELLECTUALS AND SOCIALISM 
(2001). 
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mind.6  In social contexts, a critical element of complexity is that the terms of
interaction among agents is set by a network of laws, institutions, and norms.7 
Each of these can be understood as specifying rules for individual behavior.
Consider a society in which all are interacting under a small set of rules,
say simply those that characterize a simple exchange economy. We might
suppose that a group of agents all guided by a small set of rules would
produce a highly predictable system, but this is not so.  Operating within
the rules is a very large number of individuals with highly heterogenous
preferences.8 Individuals seek to satisfy their preferences within the rules, 
where this requires that they are constantly reacting to the choices of 
others about how to satisfy their preferences.9  Such a system will be 
characterized by multiple levels of feedback loops:10 Alf’s decision becomes
an input into Betty’s, which is in turn an input into Charlie’s, which becomes a
new input into Alf’s.11  When this system contains strong positive as well 
as negative feedbacks, it easily abounds with multiple equilibria, and
the system’s behavior quickly becomes mathematically incalculable.12  As 
Donald Saari concludes: 
6. See generally Murray Gell-Mann, What Is Complexity?, 1 COMPLEXITY 16 
(1995). In physics, complexity often focuses simply on the large number of elements; in 
social science, the interconnectivity of the agents’ behaviors is typically the main concern.  Eric 
D. Beinhocker calls this “interactive complexity.”  Eric D. Beinhocker, Reflexivity,
Complexity, and the Nature of Social Science, 20 J. ECON. METHODOLOGY 330, 332 (2013). 
7. See Beinhocker, supra note 6, at 337. 
8. See id. at 332, 334. 
9.  Such systems are thus reflexive. See infra Part IV. 
10. See  JOHN H. MILLER, A CRUDE LOOK AT THE WHOLE: THE SCIENCE OF COMPLEX
SYSTEMS IN BUSINESS, LIFE, AND SOCIETY 47–68 (2015).  Many economic models normalize 
these differences away, focusing on homogeneous “representative” agents. 
11. “Complexity, in other words, asks how individual behaviors might react to the 
pattern they together create, and how that pattern would alter itself as a result.”  W. BRIAN 
ARTHUR, Complexity Economics: A Different Framework for Economic Thought, in COMPLEXITY 
AND THE ECONOMY 1, 3 (2015). 
12. With positive feedback that others are performing some action  increases one’s
tendency to also do it; with negative, others’ -ing decrease one’s tendency to . In many 
economic models, it is assumed that the feedbacks are overwhelming negative—
decreasing marginal utility/gains—thus leading the system into a unique equilibrium.  
See  ERIC D. BEINHOCKER, THE ORIGIN OF WEALTH: EVOLUTION, COMPLEXITY, AND THE 
RADICAL REMAKING OF ECONOMICS 21–34 (2006).  Once positive feedback becomes 
strong, multiple equilibria abound.  See W. BRIAN ARTHUR, INCREASING RETURNS AND PATH 
DEPENDENCE IN THE ECONOMY 13, 160 (1994); see also JOHN H. HOLLAND, COMPLEXITY: 
A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 9 (2014); JOHN H. MILLER & SCOTT E. PAGE, COMPLEX 
ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS: AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTATIONAL MODELS OF SOCIAL LIFE 83 
(Simon A. Levin & Steven H. Strogatz eds., 2007). 
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[E]ven the simple models from introductory courses in economics can exhibit 
dynamical behavior far more complex than anything found in classical physics
or biology. In fact, all kinds of complicated dynamics (e.g., involving topological 
entropy, strange attractors, and even conditions yet to be found) already arise in
elementary models that only describe how people exchange goods (a pure exchange 
model). 
Instead of being an anomaly, the mathematical source of this complexity is so
common to the social sciences that I suspect it highlights a general problem
plaguing these areas.13 
The hidden complexity of social science derives from aggregation out of 
the unlimited variety of preferences: “[P]references that define a sufficiently
large dimensional domain that, when aggregated, can generate all imaginable
forms of pathological behavior.”14 
Because such systems have strong positive return dynamics, their behavior 
is path dependent: the state of the system at time t+1 critically depends on 
its state at t.15  Without good knowledge of the overall state of the system
at t, and an accurate model of the dynamics that leads to future states, 
accurate forecasting about the system’s state at t+1 is impossible.  Slight 
differences in the initial conditions of the elements—often beyond our 
ability to measure—can result in very different t+1 system states.16  Even a
model based on simple linear dynamics can give rise to a wide variety of 
possible future states;17 with non-linear dynamics, these problems are 
greatly aggravated.18  The behavior of such systems is, within broad
13. Donald Saari, Mathematical Complexity of Simple Economics, 42 NOTICES AMS
222, 222 (1995).  Strange attractors are related to chaos theory.  See PETER SMITH, EXPLAINING 
CHAOS 143 (1998).
14. Saari, supra note 13, at 229. 
15. With positive return dynamics, a case of positive feedbacks, once a system takes 
a step toward favoring option one over option two, it can go to fixation on option one, 
though if a chance event had tilted it toward option two, it could have gone to fixation on
that.  Arthur gives the example of the familiar analog twelve-hour “clockwise” clock: in the
fifteenth century, there were clocks that went anti-clockwise, including the twenty-four-
hour clock in a Florence cathedral. See ARTHUR, supra note 12, at 5, 33–48, 133–58, 185– 
202.  The selection of the familiar clock was path dependent: once most people began 
using the familiar twelve-hour clock, others had increased incentive to also adopt it.  See 
id. at 5; MILLER, supra note 10, at 132; Beinhocker, supra note 6, at 333. 
16. SMITH, supra note 13, at 20. 
17. Beinhocker, supra note 6, at 332–33.  It is often the case that measuring these 
initial conditions with sufficient precision is beyond our ken. 
18. See DAVID COLANDER & ROLAND KUPERS, COMPLEXITY AND THE ART OF PUBLIC 
POLICY: SOLVING SOCIETY’S PROBLEMS FROM THE BOTTOM UP 117 (2014). 
 971










   
 
   





   
    
    
parameters, essentially unpredictable.19  As Hayek stressed, we can know that
some sorts of outcomes are not possible, but a very wide range of possible 
system states, often novel and unexpected, can be generated.20 
To get a bit closer to reality, now add a large number of other rules—
moral, legal, and institutional—which further affect agents’ behaviors, 
and whose overall effects are interactive.  For example, a rule with strict 
prohibition of squatter rights in urban areas will have very different effects 
depending on the presence of other rules and norms about, say, zoning, care
for the urban homeless, mental health facilities, family structures, freedom of 
movement, and so on.  And, of course, a host of background conditions are
relevant: demographic changes, real estate investment, unemployment, and
growth rates.21  When a system is composed of many rules of this sort,
which jointly determine their ultimate social realizations—as always, along 
with a highly diverse set of individuals preferences, values and personal 
normative commitments—any attempt to optimize along some metric, 
welfare, justice, or any other, confronts what is known as a “rugged 
optimization problem.”22  In these optimization problems, even assuming
that we could know with certainty the overall value of each set of institutional 
arrangements (Ri), the overall value of a set of social institutions, such as 
rules and norms, R1 may be radically different than the overall value of an
almost identical set, R2. Getting even a slight detail wrong can land a
reformer in the dire R11 rather than the attractive R10 as in Figure 1: 
19. See supra p. 970. 
20. See generally 15 F.A. HAYEK, The Pretence of Knowledge, in THE MARKET AND
OTHER ORDERS 362 (Bruce Caldwell ed., 2014). 
21. This is not a philosophical conjecture. In her extensive fieldwork on actual institutions, 
Elinor Ostrom stressed that institutions are composed of numerous rule configurations; the 
constituent rules have strong interdependencies, both with each other and with environmental 
conditions.  See generally Elinor Ostrom, An Agenda for the Study of Institutions, in CHOICE, 
RULES AND COLLECTIVE ACTION 97 (Filippo Sabetti & Paul Dragos Aligica eds., 2014).  “A 
change in any of these variables produces a different action situation and may lead to very 
different outcomes.”  Id. at 111. 
22. For accessible discussions, see BEINHOCKER, supra note 12, at 202–13; GERALDGAUS, 
THE TYRANNY OF THE IDEAL: JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 61–74 (2016). 
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FIGURE 1: CHAOTIC SOCIAL CHANGE
Figure 1 illustrates a set of institutional schemes arrayed in terms of
institutional similarity (x-axis)23 and the value of the emergent social state
(y-axis) in terms of some social goal—overall welfare, justice, or any 
other. In this case, the laws, institutions, and norms are so tightly interconnected
that a change in any rule produces changes in the outputs of every other. 
This system is chaotic: there is no correlation between the value of one 
social state and the next.24  In such chaotic worlds there are no gradients
to climb; if a change from scheme nine to ten was, say, welfare enhancing, 
a move from ten to eleven can make us worse off than we started out. 
Only if a controller had perfect knowledge of the value of each institutional
scheme and perfect ability to bring about precisely the changes that would 
hit a specific institutional setup, with no variance or “near misses”
landing on scheme twenty when we aimed for nineteenis intelligent control
possible.25  In lieu of that, changes are essentially random moves around
the possibility space; there is no room for expert control. 
It may help to turn from macro- to micro-analysis.  A traditional multivariate
regression analysis focuses on a many-to-one casual relation, as in Figure
2.
23.  On such similarity measures, see GAUS, supra note 22, at 51–61, 251–59. 
24. Cf. STUART A. KAUFFMAN, THE ORIGINS OF ORDER: SELF-ORGANIZATION AND
SELECTION IN EVOLUTION 52–54 (1993) (analyzing “complexity catastrophe”). 
25. See GAUS, supra note 22, at 67–72. 
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FIGURE 2: A MANY-TO-ONE CAUSAL RELATION 
Here, W is the dependent variable we seek to manipulate, and variables 
V1 to V3 are the variables that determine it.  If we are able to manipulate
them, control of W is possible. Even within complex systems, some such 
relatively simple causal relations may occur.  Yet, typically even in relatively
simple cases, we should expect feedback and unanticipated variables as in
Figure 3.
FIGURE 3: A MANY-TO-ONE CAUSAL RELATION WITH FEEDBACKS AND 
UNKNOWN INFLUENCES
Prediction becomes surprisingly difficult as soon as feedbacks enter in.  
But still, it might be thought, if what we really care about is only manipulating
W, so long as there are not too many layers of feedback and we have identified 
many of the relevant variables, we can have a reasonable chance at successful 
policy interventions aiming to manipulate W’s value. If we are single-minded
in our concern26—say, we care only about how minimum wage laws affect
employment—something akin to the relations in Figure 3 might well give 
26. See infra Section V.C.
974
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us sufficient causal leverage.27  But unless we are very limited in our concerns, 
we would like to predict and perhaps control other aspects of the social 
order as well. However, we are then apt to be confronted with many cases 
more akin to Figure 4: 
FIGURE 4: A MANY-TO-MANY CAUSAL RELATION WITH FEEDBACKS
The problem is now becoming clearer: as we seek to influence a number
of variables, W, X, Y, and Z, even if we do secure some initial leverage on 
W, we find that it affects, and is affected by, a host of other variables that 
we are also interested in manipulating.  Thus, as Hayek suggested, one
intervention produces effects that may or may not give us some of what
we aimed for, but which produces unexpected changes that require a
policy intervention.28 In turn, this policy intervention produces effects that 
further require amelioration.29  As we proceed, our initial manipulation of 
W is apt to be undone.
27. This is a typical sort of case that more skeptical readers may have in mind.  It 
is worth noting that, as the current analysis would predict, it is surprisingly uncertain what 
the employment effects of minimum wage laws are.  They tend to be negative, but the magnitude 
of effects is very difficult to predict, and sometimes employment is not affected at all, or 
even positively.  For a review of a number of studies, see generally Gerald Gaus, Is the Public 
Incompetent? Compared to Whom? About What?, 20 CRITICAL REV. 291 (2008). 
28. See generally HAYEK, supra note 5, at 45–51. 
29. See id. at 70.
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Complex systems give rise to macro emergent properties, which are not 
reducible to analysis of the constituent micro-elements apart from their 
interaction in the system.30  This, perhaps, is the core idea of complexity 
analysis: a reductionist program of seeking to understand the micro-parts
in isolation cannot explain the global patterns of their large-scale interactions.31 
There is nothing spooky about such properties. In social systems, emergent 
properties are best understood as a global behavior or pattern that arises 
from the self-organized interaction of the constituent agents—a pattern 
that “is rather alien to its origins.”32  Simplistically, but still usefully, we can 
say that the whole is more than the sum of its parts.33  One of the features 
of such global properties is that they can be realized by a variety of underlying 
rules and agents; different agents and systems of rules can all give rise to 
a pattern of interaction that we associate, say, with democracy.34  On the other
hand, an identical rule system can give rise to very different global patterns.35 
30. See  SUNNY Y. AUYANG, FOUNDATIONS OF COMPLEX-SYSTEM THEORIES: IN 
ECONOMICS, EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY, AND STATISTICAL PHYSICS 173–83 (1998).  One 
accessible formulation was proposed by John Stuart Mill.  Supposing a system S composed 
of elements, or rules, {R1. . .RN} and an overall resulting order O, Mill suggests that O is 
an emergent property if: (1) O is not the sum of {R1. . .RN}; (2) O is of an entirely different 
character than {R1. . .RN}; and (3) O cannot not be predicted or deduced from the behavior of
the members of {R1. . .RN} considered independently—apart from their interactions in S. 
See generally 7 JOHN STUART MILL, A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive: Being 
a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation, in 
THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL, 370–73, 438–40 (J.M. Robson ed., Univ. 
of Toronto Press 2006) (1843). 
31. MILLER, supra note 10, at ch. 2. 
32. Id. at 6, 133–35.  Miller points to Adam Smith’s invisible hand as a very early
example, but this is debatable.  See id. at 5, 231.  As Smith presents the argument, the claim is 
that the aggregation of individual value maximization leads to the maximum possible sum 
of value, which is the “annual revenue of the society.” ADAM SMITH, Of Systems of
Political Economy, in  AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 447, 477 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1976).  It is not clear how alien this aggregation 
claim is from its origins.  If, however, one understands this as a primitive general equilibrium 
theory, then it seems right to see the invisible hand as giving rise to an emergent property.  
Compare this with Miller’s view that Smith’s invisible hand posits an almost miraculous 
process. See MILLER, supra note 10, at 231; Gerald F. Gaus, Public and Private Interests 
in Liberal Political Economy, Old and New, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN SOCIAL LIFE 183, 
183, 189–92 (S.I. Benn & G.F. Gaus eds., 1983). 
33. See HOLLAND, supra note 12, at 54; see also F.A. HAYEK, Notes on the Evolution of
Systems of Rules of Conduct, in STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS 66, 70 
(1967) (“The overall order of actions in a group is . . . more than the totality of regularities 
observable in the actions of the individuals and cannot be wholly reduced to them.”). 
34. See MILLER, supra note 10, at 138. 
35. See HAYEK, supra note 33, at 68 (“The same set of rules of individual conduct 
may in some circumstances bring about a certain order of actions, but not do so in different 
external circumstances.”). 
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Hayek’s analysis is especially helpful here.  On his view, rule-based,
large-scale human interactions  produce an “order of actions”—a pattern
of cooperation or conflict that emerges from the underlying moral and social
rules and the way heterogeneous agents act under them.36  When we ask 
whether a society is cooperative or conflictual, just or oppressive, productive 
or dysfunctional, we are asking about the character of its order of actions, 
about the global pattern of behavior that emerges from diverse agents operating 
under its social norms, laws, culture, and so on.  The critical point of complexity 
analysis is that this order of actions is not simply the aggregation of the 
consequences of many individual laws and rules; rather, it is an ongoing 
global pattern of social life produced by the interconnected effects of a 
large set of rules, and the diverse agents acting under them.37  When we
inquire as to what will make our society more cooperative, less conflictual, 
more just, more tolerant, more conducive to human welfare, more productive, 
or ecologically sustainable, we are focusing on the global, emergent property 
of the order of actions. 
C. Understanding Complex Systems 
There is little doubt that our social systems are complex in these ways—
they thus produce “perpetual novelty.”38  When we intuitively think about
the world using our folk concepts of causation and recall past cases as 
successful incidents of control, many refuse to accept this.39  Here, as in 
evolutionary theory and much of physics, commonsense and analytic reasoning 
part ways.40  However, as this last thought makes clear, like evolutionary
36. Id.; see also Eric Mack, Hayek on Justice and the Order of Actions, in  THE
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HAYEK 259, 261–62 (Edward Feser ed., 2006). 
37. See HAYEK, supra note 33, at 70–71. 
38. HOLLAND, supra note 12, at 10. 
39. See NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY 
IMPROBABLE 70–73 (2007).
40. It was recently remarked to me that social scientific reasoning is essentially a 
confirmation of commonsense.  When successful, it is usually just the opposite: it shows that 
intelligent common sense misunderstands the social world.  That is why Adam Smith’s 
invisible hand in some ways invented social science: the common sense conviction that orderly 
social outcomes must be produced by a directing intelligence, which was Mercantilist common 
sense, is fundamentally erroneous.  On Mercantilism, see generally THOMAS MUN, ENGLAND’S 
TREASURE BY FORRAIGN TRADE. OR THE BALLANCE OF OUR FORRAIGN TRADE IS THE RULE 
OF OUR TREASURE (Kelley 1965) (1664).  Adam Smith’s invisible hand claim occurs in his 
critique of the Mercantilist view.  See SMITH, supra note 32, at 477.  And, of course, Darwin 
provides a similar rebuke to common sense.  See generally CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN 
OF SPECIES: A FACSIMILE OF THE FIRST EDITION (Harvard Univ. Press 2001) (1859). 
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theory, complexity analysis does not advocate a generalized skepticism,
but seeks to model and understand the workings of complex systems.
Important agent-based complexity models, for example, abstracting from
many of the details of a specific system, generate probability distributions 
that the system will end up in different parts of the possible system space.41 
Models may also help identify tipping or “lever points,” system states in
which a small change can produce large predictable changes.42  At least
in some biological systems, we can model what is required to reverse 
engineer an emergent property.43 
That we can develop a science of complex systems, such as economics, 
is constantly stressed by Hayek.44 Our question concerns the type of 
predictions such a science might yield about the future of our current 
society.  In order to accurately predict the range of possible outcomes, the 
modeler needs to define the possible state space of societythe set of 
possible outcomesthe rules of interactions, and the value functions of 
the individuals modeledthe bases of choices.45  Even allowing that these 
models will become considerably more sophisticated in the future, because 
these variables are maddeningly difficult to measure and, indeed, are always
in flux, it seems well-nigh impossible to identify the parameters for an
accurate model of the probability distributions of overall social outcomes 
of our current social order.  And, of course, we must always remember that in 
complex systems, getting the parameters a little wrong can often lead to very
different predicted outcomes, as indicated in Figure 1.  Hayek’s view remains
essentially sound: a science of social complexity can predict, for social 
state S, “a pattern of a certain class”—say, marked disequilibrium or high 
conflict—not a “prediction of the appearance of a particular instance of 
this class.”46 
41. See MILLER, supra note 10, at 217–18. 
42. HOLLAND, supra note 12, at 25; see MILLER, supra note 10, at 197–99 (exploring
the criticality of physical and social systems). 
43. See Sara Green, Can Biological Complexity Be Reverse Engineered?, 53 STUD.
HIST. & PHIL. BIOLOGICAL & BIOMEDICAL SCI. 73, 77, 80 (2015). 
44. In his Nobel laureate address, Hayek discusses the economist’s pretense to 
specific types of knowledge, not that there cannot exist scientific economic knowledge.  
See generally 15 HAYEK, supra note 20; Robert Axtell et al., Challenges of Integrating 
Complexity and Evolution Into Economics, in COMPLEXITY AND EVOLUTION: TOWARD A 
NEW SYNTHESIS FOR ECONOMICS 65 (David S. Wilson & Alan Kirman eds., 2016)
(providing a more recent analysis of economics as a complex science). 
45. See MILLER, supra note 10, at 217–19. 
46. F.A. HAYEK, The Theory of Complex Phenomena, in STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY,
POLITICS AND ECONOMICS, supra note 33, at 22, 24. 
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III. TWO HOPES FOR SUCCESSFUL SOCIAL GUIDANCE
Given that our social system is highly complex in these ways and that
prediction and guidance of such systems seems a most dubious enterprise, 
under what conditions might we nevertheless hope to successfully guide
the emergent order of actions along a preferred path? 
A. The First Hope: Decomposability
The most viable route is to reduce the complexity of the system, and the 
most plausible hypothesis about how this can occur maintains that complex 
systems are often decomposable.47  Suppose we have a set of rules, institutions,
and norms {R1. . .R25} with subsets {R1. . .R10}, {R11. . .R15}, {R16. . .R25},
where the rules within each subset are highly interconnected,48 but the 
connections between the subsets are modest.  At a limit, each subset could 
be a module that could connect with the others such that regardless of the 
changes that occurred within it, it could be “plugged into” the others without 
inducing any change in them.49  In this case, we could optimize within 
each subset and then assemble the results, maintaining the optimization 
within each set.  Herbert Simon has powerfully argued that evolving complex 
systems must be decomposable in this way.50  If a change in one element
produced changes in all the others, a species could not climb an evolutionary 
gradient and become increasingly fit.51  If every change in the organism’s
ability to run faster affected all its other traits, the organism would be in a 
state of constant instability.  Decomposability, then, makes the system less 
complex, less tightly interconnected. 
Some have taken the necessity of decomposability for evolution to
show that, after all, intelligent attempts to guide complex systems along
47. On the idea of decomposable complex systems, see Fred D’Agostino, From the
Organization to the Division of Cognitive Labor, 8 POL., PHIL. & ECON. 101, 115–16 
(2009).  Much of what is covered in Section III.A follows D’Agostino’s excellent analysis. 
48. See supra Section II.A. 
49. See D’Agostino, supra note 47, at 116.  In this respect, recall Rawls’s claim that 
a public conception of justice is a module that fits into multiple comprehensive conceptions. 
See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 12 (expanded ed. 2005).  Interestingly, Rawls is 
claiming that people’s normative systems are decomposable.  It is not clear why they 
should be. 
50. See HERBERT A. SIMON, THE SCIENCES OF THE ARTIFICIAL 197–204 (3d ed. 1996). 
51. See id. at 193, 204–05; see also ALLEN BUCHANAN & RUSSEL POWELL, THE 
EVOLUTION OF MORAL PROGRESS: A BIOCULTURAL THEORY 264 (2018). 
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desired paths are feasible.52  We can manipulate one part of the system
without altering the rest, so if we focus on one decomposable subsystem 
at a time, real guidance can be achieved.53 Now certainly we will sometimes 
find relatively independent subsystems and, when we do, the probability 
of success of our intervention will be enhanced.  Nevertheless, for at least 
two reasons we must not infer that we possess the ability to direct social 
change from the necessity of decomposability in evolved systems. 
First, each subset might itself be highly complex.  In this case, although 
a change in {R1. . .R10} may have minor impact on the rest of the system,
a change in any rule within the subset produces changes in the output of 
many of the subset’s other rules, again producing highly complex outcomes.  
Natural selection can often cope with such “high dimensional” selection.54 
If a species has a large number of offspring, a wide range of possible genetic 
combinations, in our case, {R1. . .R10} variations, can compete and the most 
adaptive complex combinations can be selected.55  As a result, we can 
understand how biological evolution can function with decomposability 
conjoined with highly complex subsystems.  However, in social 
“experimentation,” this problem is almost always intractable.56 Ethically, we
cannot simply randomly experiment with types of social arrangements to 
see which work and which die out; practically, insofar as these are large-
scale arrangements, there simply is not a sufficient number of variants to 
cope with the problem of such high complexity partitions.  We can only try 
out a modest number of the possibilities to determine which are adaptive.  
Only if the subsystems themselves are relatively noncomplex does it seem 
that decomposability can be of much help here. 
Second, there is good reason to think that as human constructed functional
systems evolve, they become more complex and less decomposable.57 
Consider Brian Arthur’s study of the evolution of the jet engine.58  The 
original jet engine had one moving part; current engines have more than 
52. See BUCHANAN & POWELL, supra note 51, at 264–65. 
53. See id. at 265. 
54. Natural selection is high dimensional because the trait being selected is an
emergent property of many interacting genes.  See Sergey Gavrilets, High-Dimensional 
Fitness Landscapes and Speciation, in  EVOLUTION—THE EXTENDED SYNTHESIS 45, 68 
(Massimo Pigliucci & Gerd B. Müller eds., 2010).  Few traits are controlled by a single 
gene. See id. at 68–70. 
55. See id. at 49. 
56. See supra Section II.B; infra Section V.B.
 57. See W. BRIAN ARTHUR, On the Evolution of Complexity, in COMPLEXITY AND
THE ECONOMY, supra note 11, at 144, 144–58 (discussing three different mechanisms by 
which complexity increases with evolution); KEVIN N. LALAND, DARWIN’S UNFINISHED 
SYMPHONY: HOW CULTURE MADE THE HUMAN MIND 10–11 (2017) (noting how the pace 
of technological complexity has increased over time). 
58. See ARTHUR, supra note 57, at 149–50. 
980
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22,000 moving parts.59  What started as a remarkably simple system is now
a highly complex one.  Moreover, jet engine technology is now intimately 
linked to a number of other systems, for example, those producing alloys, 
computer systems, and the Federal Aviation Administration.60  Jet engine
technology has thus become more complex and less decomposable.  Because 
of this, as Schumpeter stressed, advanced economies are subject to the “gales” 
of creative destruction: entire areas of the economy may ultimately be wiped 
out when there is a major technological change, say, from horse drawn 
carriages to automobiles.61  In many ways, technology is a better model
of the evolution of institutional complexity than natural selection: simple
technologies are assembled and combined to solve problems, modified
with an eye to increasing functionality and solving new problems, producing 
ever greater complexity.  Of course, compared to human society, a jet engine 
is astoundingly simple; experts, though perhaps now only in highly trained
teams, continue to know how it works. But like technology, we have constantly
rendered our institutions more complex and more intimately tied to the
rest of our social system.  As Miller observes, for example, “[w]e have
unknowingly created a complex adaptive financial system that we do not
understand and cannot control.  At each stage of its creation, we have accrued 
additional complexity in the name of added benefits.”62 
B. The Second Hope: Experiments in Complex Living 
From Mill, Dewey, and Popper, to important and innovative contemporary
political philosophers, great hope has been placed on discovering better
societies through social experimentation.63  Often this is simply a name 
59. Id. 
60. See id. at 149. 
61. See W. BRIAN ARTHUR, The Economy Evolving as Its Technologies Evolve, in
COMPLEXITY AND THE ECONOMY, supra note 11, at 134, 141; JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, 
CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 83–84 (2d ed. 1947). 
62. MILLER, supra note 10, at 62; cf. NEIL F. JOHNSON, SIMPLY COMPLEXITY: A
CLEAR GUIDE TO COMPLEXITY THEORY 124–25 (2007) (noting the possibility of market 
prediction for limited periods, until periods of randomness set in). 
63. See generally  JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS ch. 6 (1954); 18
JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL, supra 
note 30, at 213, 260–61 (J.M. Robson ed., 1977) (reasoning that individual liberty allows 
for “experiments in living” and, therefore, interference with that liberty is only justified 
when another is damaged); RYAN MULDOON, SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY FOR A DIVERSE 
WORLD: BEYOND TOLERANCE ch. 2 (2016) (extending Mill’s “experiments in living” by 
looking to culture exchange to promote social experimentation); JULIAN F. MÜLLER, 
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for exploring new ways of living together, but we should not confuse 
innovation, or being open to learning, with experimentation.64  The thought 
behind social experiments or “experiments in living” is that, while we 
cannot predict whether social policies will improve the order of actions 
and make it more just, experiments can be conducted that help us learn the 
consequences of various rule sets and institutions, and so obtain information 
that can guide other situations or societies.65  The key to experimentation
is that the lessons learned in experiments are in some way replicable—
they provide data that can show what works in other places.  In place of
strong predictive knowledge based on models or theories, we might take 
a more inductive, experimental approach. 
I have argued elsewhere that such informal experiments are unlikely to 
give us much useful information about workable social arrangements,66 
but let us assume that the experiments could meet the strongest contemporary
standard for studying interventions—the Randomized Controlled Trial 
(RCT).  In some ways it seems that RCTs are ideally suited to studying the 
combinatorial effects underlying complexity.
An RCT is a study design based on John Stuart Mill’s method of difference for
making causal inferences.  Mill’s method-of-difference supposes, as we do here, that 
effects are produced in accord with causal principles.  The causal principles for a 
given kind of situation or population, S, say what the causes of a given effect in 
S are, what each contributes, and how they combine.  A method-of-difference study 
then aims to compare individual units that are the same with respect to all causal
factors relevant to the given effect except the one in question, by which they
differ. If individuals that are otherwise the same differ in values for the effect,
then the factor by which they differ must be among the genuine causes of the 
effect under the principles governing S.67 
The great problem, though, is identifying all the relevant causal factors: if 
we have not identified the full set of relevant factors, our confidence that
we know the causal network is undermined.68  And it is precisely this plethora
of relevant, and indeed changing,69 causal factors that confounds study of
complex social systems.  Using a RCT in one situation, against the background 
POLITICAL PLURALISM, DISAGREEMENT AND JUSTICE: THE CASE FOR POLYCENTRIC
DEMOCRACY pt. 2 (2019) (discussing the role of diversity and moral progress in political
pluralism); 1 K.R. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES ch. 9 (Harper & Row, 
Publishers, Inc. 1963) (1945) (discussing the dangers of large scale “utopian engineering”
and advocating for smaller scale social experiments).
64. See generally PHILIP KITCHER, THE ETHICAL PROJECT ch. 3 (2011). 
65. See generally Elizabeth S. Anderson, John Stuart Mill and Experiments in Living, 
102 ETHICS 1 (1991). 
66. See generally GAUS, supra note 22, at 89–93. 
67. NANCY CARTWRIGHT & JEREMY HARDIE, EVIDENCE-BASED POLICY: A PRACTICAL 
GUIDE TO DOING IT BETTER 33 (2012) (citation omitted). 
68. Id. at 38. 
69. Beinhocker, supra note 6, at 335–36. 
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of a specific complex system at a specific time, is apt to tell one little about
future interventions against a different state of the system.70  If many parts
of the system affect the outcome, and the input of the system at time t1+1 
includes people’s reactions to its state at t1, it will be fiendishly hard to 
have any confidence that one has accounted for the causal influences 
during one’s controlled trial.71  “Like us,” Nancy Cartwright and Jeremy 
Hardie observe, “you want evidence that a policy will work here, where you 
are. Randomized controlled trials do not tell you that.  They do not even
tell you that a policy works. What they tell you is that a policy worked there,
where the trial was carried out, in that population.”72 
IV. ADAPTIVE COMPLEXITY
A. Why Not the State of Nature? 
The sort of social systems we have been analyzing—where agents
respond to each other’s actions and adapt their actions in response to each
other’s previous adaptations—are known as complex and reflexive adaptive 
systems.73  David S. Wilson, in an important essay, asks the question:
what renders these complex interactions adaptive, as opposed to simply 
complex but dysfunctional?74  We cannot simply assume that complex
systems are able to maintain their functionality.  Indeed, if we compare a 
complex system—with its pervasive positive feedbacks and path dependencies 
—to the world of neoclassical economics—with its strong negative feedbacks 
leading to unique equilibrium—it may seem a marvel that the former 
gives rise to any order at all. 
70. See id. at 335–36. 
71. See Gillian Tett, Opinion, Weird Things Keep Happening in the Markets, FIN.
TIMES (Apr. 4, 2019) https://www.ft.com/content/e0325354-56c7-11e9-91f9-b6515a54c5b1
[https://perma.cc/TGC8-VKNT]. This is one of the reasons why big data is no panacea.
If the parameters change, regularities that were once law-like can suddenly cease to hold. 
But see Liran Einav & Jonathan Levin, Economics in the Age of Big Data, 346 SCIENCE
715, 715 (2014). 
72. CARTWRIGHT & HARDIE, supra note 67, at ix.
73. On the relation between complex adaptive and complex reflexive systems, see 
Beinhocker, supra note 6, at 334. 
74. See generally David S. Wilson, Two Meanings of Complex Adaptive Systems, 
in  COMPLEXITY AND EVOLUTION: TOWARD A NEW SYNTHESIS FOR ECONOMICS 31 (David
S. Wilson & Alan Kirman eds., 2016).  Another way of making this point is to ask why 
there is organized, as opposed to disorganized, complexity.  We can be loose here as to what 
we mean by “dysfunctional”: great conflict, low levels of cooperation and mass emigration 
are all familiar indicators. 
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In the history of political theory, it has often been thought, following
Hobbes, that functional social order is constructed through the politico-
legal system.  Unlike, say, Locke or Rawls, Hobbes does not simply analyze 
the basis of a just political order among those who disagree: Leviathan
lays out the conditions for social order itself under conditions of deeply
heterogeneous and conflicting ends.75  Hobbes’s social contract rationally 
constructs the path out of a barely social, self-interested existence in which 
“there is no place for industry, . . . no culture of the earth, . . . no knowledge
of the face of the earth, no account of time, no arts, no letters, no society.”76 
Hobbes is so appealing to the philosophical mind because reason has a
starring role in the story. Although strategic rationality is a cause of our
conflict in the state of nature, reason also points the way to society: it shows 
us that we can only attain a functional, cooperative social order by renouncing
unconstrained self-interested maximization and binding ourselves into a 
cooperative, rule-based, truly social order.  Captivated by this idea, a long 
line of distinguished moral and political theorists, right up to the present, 
have developed sophisticated accounts of social life grounded on essentially 
self-interested, instrumental rationality.77 
Hayek famously argued that complex social orders cannot be consciously 
constructed or ordered purely through planning.78  And on this, I think,
almost all complexity theorists would agree, for the reasons canvassed in 
Part II. What we cannot guide we certainly cannot construct.  But then Wilson’s 
question becomes pressing: just how does an unplanned complex order 
maintain itself? 
B. Macro-Selection (CAS1) 
In what Wilson calls Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS1), the complex
system is subject to adaptive pressures at the system level.79  This is a form
of multi-level selection—in the most familiar form, a type of “group selection.”80 
On Wilson’s view, this is the most plausible basis for complex system-
75. See TALCOTT PARSONS, THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ACTION: A STUDY IN SOCIAL
THEORY WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO A GROUP OF RECENT EUROPEAN WRITERS, 89–95 (2d 
ed., Free Press 1949) (1937). 
76. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 76 (Edwin Curley ed., 1994). 
77. See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE LIMITS OF LIBERTY: BETWEEN ANARCHY
AND LEVIATHAN (1975). See generally DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT (1986);
MICHAEL MOEHLER, MINIMAL MORALITY: A MULTILEVEL SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY 
(2018); PETER VANDERSCHRAAF, STRATEGIC JUSTICE: CONVENTION AND PROBLEMS OF 
BALANCING DIVERGENT INTERESTS (2018).
78. See generally 1 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER
(1973).
79. Wilson, supra note 74, at 31. 
80. SAMIR OKASHA, EVOLUTION AND THE LEVELS OF SELECTION 56 (2006). 
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level adaptation: “From an evolutionary perspective, . . . only when a society 
is a unit of selection . . . does [it] function well as a unit.”81  The critical claim 
is that a complex social order will maintain its cooperative functionality
only if, at the societal level, forces are constantly selecting more over less
functional variants of the rules {R1. . .RN}. Recall that the entire set of 
rules and social institutions {R1. . .RN} generates what Hayek calls an 
“order of actions”—the emergent property of social order that arises in a
rule based society.82  Hayek agrees with Wilson: “The evolutionary selection 
of different rules of individual conduct operates through the viability of 
the order it will produce.”83  A fundamental insight of Hayek is the distinction
between a set of rules and the emergent order of actions to which it gives 
rise. This insight allows him to distinguish the focus of selective pressure, 
the overall functionality of the order, and the underlying rules and institutions 
that structure it.84 
Social evolution is often thought to be a form of cultural group selection.85 
“These rules of conduct have . . . evolved because the groups who practised
them were more successful and displaced others.”86  As I have written: if
society S1, characterized by order of actions O1, is more productive than 
S2 based on O2, society S1 will tend to win conflicts with S2. This is a
mechanism akin to natural selection: O1 was more adaptive than O2.87 
Alternatively, the members of S2, seeing the better-off participants in S1 
characterized by O1, may either immigrate to S1, or seek to copy the 
underlying rules R1, thus inducing differential rates of reproduction between 
the two sets of underlying rules.88 The overall order of actions is adaptive
81. Wilson, supra note 74, at 44. 
82. F.A. HAYEK, The Principles of a Liberal Social Order, in STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY,
POLITICS AND ECONOMICS, supra note 33, at 160, 169; see supra Section II.B. 
 83. HAYEK, supra note 33, at 68. 
84. There is an obvious analogy here to natural selection: selective pressures select 
a successful phenotype, with the underlying genotype being transmitted. 
85. Robert Boyd & Peter J. Richerson, Culture and the Evolution of Human
Cooperation, 364 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B 3281, 3285 (2009). 
86. HAYEK, supra note 78, at 18. 
87.  For formal modelling of this process, see SAMUEL BOWLES & HERBERT GINTIS,
A COOPERATIVE SPECIES: HUMAN RECIPROCITY AND ITS EVOLUTION (2011); ROBERT BOYD 
& PETER J. RICHERSON, CULTURE AND THE EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS 173–203 (1985). 
88. See generally ALEX MESOUDI, CULTURAL EVOLUTION: HOW DARWINIAN THEORY
CAN EXPLAIN HUMAN CULTURE AND SYNTHESIZE THE SOCIAL SCIENCES chs. 3–5 (2011); 
PETER J. RICHERSON & ROBERT BOYD, NOT BY GENES ALONE: HOW CULTURE TRANSFORMED 
HUMAN EVOLUTION ch. 3 (2005).  The extent to which successful copying is possible 
depends on the complexity of the social systems and the luck the copier has in copying the 
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because systematic-selection pressures favor rule sets that promote overall 
orders that are more adept at facilitating cooperation and securing its social
benefits, satisfying the interests and commitments of its populating agents.89 
I think it is plausible to hold, as many do, that such macro-social selection 
pressures have been great during some epochs.  It is certainly plausible to 
hold that in the Late Pleistocene Era, human groups were subject to severe 
selection pressures, and those orders that were less intensely cooperative
were eliminated.90  A similar case can be made for eras of intense warfare.91 
It is, I would venture, considerably less plausible to think that most societies 
are subject to equally strong pressures of this sort today.  To be sure, some
societies do look severely dysfunctional and the expected mass emigration
has occurred.92  But most social orders have become, as societies, sufficiently 
wealthy that they can withstand competition with other societies without 
great adjustments.93  Harsh, quickly changing climate and numerous socially
distinct groups near the margin of viability gave rise to strong group selection 
pressures in the Late Pleistocene Era.94  We would expect that our modern 
era, characterized by the absence of these features, would have greatly mitigated
macro-selection pressures.  Moreover, what Hayek called “the Great Society”95 
—an expansive transnational network of rule-based cooperation—blurs the 
boundaries between groups on which macro-competition depends. While
set of rules of a decomposable subunit of the more adaptive society.  As societies become 
more complex, the possibility for copying the right set of rules to induce the desired results 
would seem to radically decreasewitness the efforts over the last fifty years of development 
experts to transplant institutions from developed to developing countries.  See generally
Jeswald W. Salacuse, From Developing Countries to Emerging Markets: A Changing Role 
for the Law in the Third World, 33 INT’L LAW. 875 (1999).
89. Gerald Gaus, Morality As a Complex Adaptive System: Rethinking Hayek’s 
Social Ethics, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 148, 148–49 (Mark 
D. White ed., 2019).
90. See  BOWLES & GINTIS, supra note 87, at 93–110; RICHERSON & BOYD, supra
note 88, at 224–29.  See generally Peter J. Richerson & Robert Boyd, Rethinking
Paleoanthropology: A World Queerer than We Supposed, in EVOLUTION OF MIND, BRAIN, 
AND CULTURE 263 (Gary Hatfield & Holly Pittman eds., 2013). 
91. See generally PETER TURCHIN, ULTRASOCIETY: HOW 10,000 YEARS OF WAR 
MADE HUMANS THE GREATEST COOPERATORS ON EARTH (2016).
92. Consider Zimbabwe and Venezuela. See generally Nhlalo Ndaba, Ordinary
Zimbabweans Tell Us Why They Want to Emigrate, TIMES LIVE (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www. 
timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2017-11-15-ordinary-zimbabweans-tell-us-why-they-want-to- 
emigrate/ [https://perma.cc/J64Z-CR54]; Katy Watson, Venezuela: The Country That Has 
Lost Three Million People, BBC (Dec. 30, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-
america-46524248 [https://perma.cc/U8DY-FTK4].
93. Compare here Schumpeter’s analysis of late capitalism, in which firms have grown 
sufficiently large to weather the gales of creative destruction, and so competition and innovation 
slow. See SCHUMPETER, supra note 61, at 87. 
94. Gaus, supra note 89, at 150. 
95.  3 F.A. HAYEK, THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE 160 (1979). 
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some investigators see strong group macro-selection pressures continuing 
today,96 this seems highly conjectural. 
C. Individual-Level Adjustment (CAS2) 
This leads us to the second type of complex adaptive system identified
by Wilson, his “CAS2” system: adaptation via adjustment by each actor to 
the previous and anticipated actions of others.97 This can be understood
as a strongly self-organized system: 
Self-organizing systems are a special subset of dynamical systems. The hallmark
of self-organization is the emergence of order from the interactions among a 
typically large number of components without any centralized control. . . . In 
cases of pure self-organization there is no real centralization of information or control, 
but the behavior of each affects that of the others in a manner that produces an overall
appearance of deliberately coordinated activity.98 
The invisible hand is, of course, the most famous model of self-organization in
the social sciences.99  These systems seem truly self-organized; rather than 
being formed by the pressure of competition with other groups, individuals
act to adjust their activity to that of others, producing a cooperative and
functional order.100 
Wilson believes that such systems could only be functionally organized
by chance because of what might be called his “evolutionary mindset”: at
each level, actors are seeking to maximize their individual fitness in competition 
with others, and so unless this competition is suppressed by a higher level
selection, there is no reason to think that group functional cooperation will
96. This is an implication of Wilson’s view.  Wilson, supra note 74, at 42–46.  Small
scale societies continue to be subjected to stronger macro-selection pressures.  See RICHERSON 
& BOYD, supra note 88, at 206–09. 
97. See Wilson, supra note 74, at 42–46. 
98. J.T. ISMAEL, HOW PHYSICS MAKES US FREE 19 (2016); see also J.T. Ismael, Self-
Organization and Self-Governance, 30 PHIL. SOC. SCI. 1, 2 (2010). 
99.  Not surprisingly, macro-evolution theorists tend to be dismissive of the idea of
the invisible hand unless it occurs in the context of a system with fairly strong selection at 
the group level.  See Wilson, supra note 74, at 44; see also John Gowdy et al., Shaping the 
Evolution of Complex Societies, in COMPLEXITY AND EVOLUTION: TOWARD A NEW SYNTHESIS 
FOR ECONOMICS, supra note 74, at 327, 331.  However, models that understand evolution 
in terms of learning rules that lead agents to adopt more advantageous cooperative 
strategies and norms (CAS2 systems) seem well described as “the invisible hand of natural 
selection.”  J. MCKENZIE ALEXANDER, THE STRUCTURAL EVOLUTION OF MORALITY 18 (2007). 
100. See Wilson, supra note 74, at 32. 
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emerge—it would be only a random event.101  This, of course, is a very
large issue, indeed. Any response to Wilson’s challenge must ultimately
involve a comprehensive account of a human cooperative social order.
Nevertheless, I think we can get a sketch of the nature of a defense of CAS2
adaptation by distinguishing three levels of responses, from that which 
shares most with Wilson’s evolutionary mindset to the increasingly cultural.  
All, I believe, are part of the story, though the later layers are more critical.
1. Cooperation Among Egoists 
A standard problem for the evolutionary theorist has been to explain how 
cooperative sentiments and morality can arise in the ruthless evolutionary
“state of nature,”102 in which each organism is in a never-ending struggle
with other members of its own species, as well as others, to insure the 
survival of itself and its descendants.  At the heart of Darwinian natural 
selection is the Malthusian doctrine of a “struggle for existence,” produced
by population growth outstripping the environment’s carrying capacity.103 
In looking at Nature, it is most necessary to keep the foregoing considerations 
always in mind—never to forget that every single organic being may be said to
be striving to the utmost to increase in numbers; that each lives by a struggle at 
some period of its life; that heavy destruction inevitably falls either on the young
or old, during each generation or at recurrent intervals.104 
The horror of Hobbes’s state of nature pales in comparison to never-
ending destruction of the less fit in Darwin’s.105  Without strong macro-
selection pressures, how could such a thoroughly nasty, ceaseless competition 
produce anything but Machiavellian cooperators, feigning commitment to 
the social contract, and social cooperation while, like Hobbesian agents, 
always keeping an eye out for opportunistic cheating?106 
101. See id. at 40. 
102. See CHARLES DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES: BY MEANS OF NATURAL SELECTION 
OR THE PRESERVATION OF FAVORED RACES IN THE STRUGGLE FOR LIFE AND THE DESCENT 
OF MAN AND SELECTION IN RELATION TO SEX 54–55 (1936). 
103. See id. at 55; THOMAS ROBERT MALTHUS, An Essay on the Principle of Population 
(1798), in AN ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION 15, 15–17 (Philip Appleman ed., 1976). 
104. DARWIN, supra note 102, at 55. 
105. See id.
106. This Hobbesian view of the evolutionary state of nature is reinforced by the
characterization of our nearest relatives, chimpanzees and bonobos, as Machiavellian cooperators.  
As Tomasello concludes, “chimpanzees and bonobos are built for competition.  Thus, not 
only are they intentional, decision-making agents, who make instrumentally rational decisions 
themselves, but they also perceive others as intentional, decision-making agents with whom 
they must compete.”  MICHAEL TOMASELLO, A NATURAL HISTORY OF HUMAN MORALITY 
21–22 (2016).  Indeed, “chimpanzees and bonobos live their lives embedded in constant competition 
for resources, so they are constantly attempting to outcompete others by outfighting them, 
outsmarting them, or outfriending them.”  Id. at 26.  See generally Richard W. Byrne & 
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It is commonplace to suppose that, in many of their interactions, such 
egoistic agents would be playing Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), as in Figure
5:107 
FIGURE 5: AXELROD’S PD
This is a relentlessly competitive game in which the best outcome of 
each is to take advantage (T) of the other, who ends up a sucker (S): in a 
one-play game, the only outcome in equilibrium is “Defect/Defect.”108 
However, as Robert Axelrod famously demonstrated, in repeated interactions, 
where players confront each other an indeterminate number of times,
cooperation can arise and be sustained via a tit-for-tat strategy, according 
to which Player A first cooperates, and from then on responds on the next 
move with whatever play, defect or cooperate, that player B made on the 
previous move.109  Later, Ken Binmore stressed the abundance of possible
cooperative equilibrium strategies in iterated PDs—indeed, any contract 
to which rational players might agree to extricate themselves from the 
“Defect/Defect” outcome is a possible equilibrium strategy in an indefinitely 
Andrew Whiten, Machiavellian Intelligence, in MACHIAVELLIAN INTELLIGENCE II:EXTENSIONS 
AND EVALUATIONS 1 (Andrew Whiten & Richard W. Byrne ed., 1997). 
107. See Prisoner’s Dilemma, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Apr. 2, 2019), https://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/prisoner-dilemma/ [https://perma.cc/R2MY-8ZG2]. 
108. Robert Axelrod, The Emergence of Cooperation Among Egoists, 75 AM. POL.
  SCI. REV. 306, 396 (1981). 
109. Id. at 308, 311. It is worth noting the striking convergence of evolutionary and
rational actor analyses of the evolution of cooperation via iterated Prisoner’s Dilemmas. 
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repeated PD.110  Binmore, Trivers, and others have held that such “direct 
reciprocity” or “reciprocal altruism” is the key to the evolution of human
cooperation.111 
To be sure, this work does not get us to complex systems, only to the
conclusion that even if we accept a strongly egoistic starting point it is
still plausible, pace Hobbes, to explain the evolution of self-organized 
cooperation.112  In later work, Axelrod sought to show how similar starting
points can give rise to agent-based complex systems.113  Still, it does not
seem that this approach has been entirely successful:114 modeling the
evolution of cooperation on the basis of, say, dyadic play in iterated PDs 
turns out to have rather demanding informational requirements about the
previous move of all of one’s partners if opportunistic cheating is to be
curtailed.115  The point to note in this context, however, is not so much the
limits to this approach, but its striking power given its relentlessly egoistic 
starting point.
2. Strong Reciprocity
As noted in Section IV.B, it seems that during the last Pleistocene Era, 
there were indeed intense group-level selection pressures that likely forged
us into a more cooperative species.116  On this view, humans are now, to 
110. KEN BINMORE, NATURAL JUSTICE 79–82 (2005).
111. See id. at 77–92; Robert L. Trivers, The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism, 46
Q. REV. BIOLOGY 35, 38, 51 (1971); see also Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Cognitive
Adaptations for Social Exchange, in  THE ADAPTED MIND: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY 
AND THE GENERATION OF CULTURE 163, 170–79 (Jerome H. Barkow, Leda Cosmides &
John Tooby eds., 1992).
112. See BINMORE, supra note 110, at 79; supra Section IV.A.
113. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION: AGENT-BASED MODELS
OF COMPETITION AND COLLABORATION 3–8 (1997); see also JOHN H. MILLER & SCOTT E. 
PAGE, COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS: AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTATIONAL MODELS OF 
SOCIAL LIFE 178–99 (2007).
114. To be effective, it requires an extended series of dyadic interactions in which
comparable benefits at comparable costs are exchanged.  In Christopher Boehm’s judgment, 
this so severely limits its application that “reciprocal altruism must be largely set aside” as 
an explanation of group cooperation.  CHRISTOPHER BOEHM, MORAL ORIGINS: THE EVOLUTION 
OF VIRTUE, ALTRUISM, AND SHAME 73 (2012). 
115. For review of problems, see GERALD GAUS, THE ORDER OF PUBLIC REASON: A
THEORY OF FREEDOM AND MORALITY IN A DIVERSE AND BOUNDED WORLD 87–96 (2011).  
Tomasello, while accepting these worries about direct reciprocity, develops a mutualistic 
model that has some affinities.  See TOMASELLO, supra note 106, at 13.  In “mutualism,” 
benefits are exchanged at the same time, and so it is not open to defection worries.  While 
surely this is a source of cooperation, it seems of limited applicability.  But cf. Kim Sterelny, 
Cooperation, Culture, and Conflict, 67 BRIT. J. PHIL. SCI. 31, 43–46 (2016) (arguing that 
reciprocation-based cooperation evolves based on sharing in profits and minimizing free-
riding).
116. See generally BOWLES & GINTIS, supra note 87, at chs. 4–9.
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a significant extent, strong reciprocators: we tend to respond to cooperation 
with cooperation and tend to inflict punishment on those who cheat on 
cooperative rules.117  At this point in our evolutionary history, the assumption
of ruthless self-interestedness is no longer sensible.  While, of course, 
we are sometimes selfish, and a few of us are almost always selfish, most 
are often willing to cooperate when others cooperate.  This is critical: it is 
at the heart of Adam Smith’s analysis of the market and ultimately his 
account of the invisible hand.118  For Smith, it is the tendency to exchange
that is at the core of markets and the division of labor.119  Smith is often 
mistakenly read as if he thinks economic agents are egoistic,120 but he stresses
that it is our tendency to pursue our interests through exchange, not our 
tendency to maximize self-interest, that drives economic life and encourages 
the growth of extensive markets.121  Smith is explicit that individuals, 
specializing through the division of labor, need each other’s cooperation, 
and so in trading are playing a cooperative game.122  As Brian Skyrms and
his students have emphasized, such reciprocal cooperators tend not to play 
PDs but more often Stag Hunts, as in Figure 6.123 
117. See Robert Boyd et al., The Evolution of Altruistic Punishment, in MORAL
SENTIMENTS AND MATERIAL INTERESTS: THE FOUNDATIONS OF COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC 
LIFE 215, 215–18 (Herbert Gintis et al. eds., 2005); Armin Falk & Urs Fischbacher, 
Modeling Strong Reciprocity, in  MORAL SENTIMENTS AND MATERIAL INTERESTS: THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE, supra, at 193, 193–95; Ernst Fehr & 
Urs Fischbacher, The Economics of Strong Reciprocity, in  MORAL SENTIMENTS AND 
MATERIAL INTERESTS: THE FOUNDATIONS OF COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE, supra, at 
151, 151–52 ; Rajiv Sethi & E. Somanathan, Norm Compliance and Strong Reciprocity, 
in MORAL SENTIMENTS AND MATERIAL INTERESTS: THE FOUNDATIONS OF COOPERATION IN 
ECONOMIC LIFE, supra, at 229, 229–31; see also GAUS, supra note 115, at 105. 
118. See  ADAM SMITH, Of the Principle Which Gives Occasion to the Division of 
Labour, in AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra 
note 32, at 17, 17–18. 
119. See id. at 17. 
120. Adam Smith’s famous passage that misleads so many states, “It is not from the 
benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from 
their regard to their own interest.”  Id. at 18.  But that cooperation does not rely on benevolence, 
and instead draws on self-interest, does not imply that it relies on egoism.  The core idea 
of reciprocity is clear in the sentence immediately preceding: “Give me that which I want, 
and you shall have this which you want.”  Id. at 18.  That is not something that players in 
a one-play Prisoner’s Dilemma can honestly promise. 
121. See id. at 17–19. 
122. See id. at 18–19. 
123. See BRIAN SKYRMS, THE STAG HUNT AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE
123 (2004); see also ALEXANDER, supra note 99, at 102, 238–39; Justin P. Bruner,
Diversity, Tolerance, and the Social Contract, 14 POL. PHIL. & ECON. 429, 430–31 (2014). 
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FIGURE 6: A STAG HUNT
In this game, both players’ first choice is to hunt stag together; mutual 
cooperation can bring higher gains than solo hunting of hare, but it takes 
two to successfully hunt the stag, a division of labor is required.124  But to
do one’s part in the stag hunting effort when the other does not is the worst 
option: one wasted one’s effort on an unsuccessful attempt to cooperate.
Thus, there are two equilibria in this game: the “payoff dominant” Stag/
Stag and the “risk dominant” Hare/Hare.125  The problem here is not that each 
is tempted to defect, but that each needs to trust the other to do their part
if both are to secure the payoff dominant equilibrium.126 
The rational play in this game is by no means trivial; it is all too easy
for a population to spend most of its time hunting hare.127  It is critical that
individuals successfully signal their trustworthiness to each other.128  But,
as Smith was the first to stress, among strong reciprocators, the evolution 
of extensive cooperation through the division of labor is not at all mysterious.129 
Once cooperation is established, it tends to stably proceed and expand, and 
benefits all. Each individual is constantly adapting to the ongoing division
of labor, and the mutually beneficial exchanges on offer. 
Of course, in any social system—certainly including markets—people 
sometimes find themselves with opportunities to cheat.  One can get the 
124. See ALEXANDER, supra note 99, at 102. 
125.  See id. 
 126. See id.
 127. See SKYRMS, supra note 123, at 31. 
128.  See supra Part II.  See generally BRIAN SKYRMS, SIGNALS: EVOLUTION, LEARNING, 
& INFORMATION 2–3 (2010).  Public rituals may be helpful in providing common knowledge 
that all wish to cooperate.  See MICHAEL SUK-YOUNG CHWE, RATIONAL RITUAL: CULTURE,
COORDINATION, AND COMMON KNOWLEDGE 25–26 (2001). 
129. See SMITH, supra note 118, at 17–18. 
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benefits without paying the costs.  However, not only do strongly reciprocal 
cooperators confront these situations less regularly since they seek out 
cooperative interactions in which they are willing to do their part, but because 
strong reciprocators tend to punish those who do defect on cooperative 
arrangements, they tend to effectively police cooperation to halt the spread of
would-be opportunistic cheaters.130 
3. Conformity 
Although I have stressed game theoretic analyses such as the PD and 
the Stag Hunt, most agent-based models of complex systems do not typically 
employ robust assumptions about individual rationality and maximization—
many formal models employ simple learning rules.131  Indeed, what is striking 
about complex systems is how heterogeneity can give rise to complexity 
under simple choice algorithms or personal rules.132  The great contribution 
of the work of Boyd and Richerson has been to show how modes of learning 
such as conformity bias, prestige bias, and copying successful neighbors 
can promote the spread of group beneficial norms in a population.133  We are
alert to how well our neighbors are doing, for example, and as we observe 
them thriving we are apt to copy their actions.  When such copying seems 
successful, others then join in.  Because culture has evolved complex adaptive 
practices, humans typically do well by imitating the behavior of others 
around them.134  We often do not understand precisely the overall benefits
of our cultural practices, but because culture is largely transmitted via imitation, 
people typically do not have to know why something is done, only that it 
130. I have called these “rule-following punishers.” For supporting evidence, see
GAUS, supra note 115, at 101–04. 
131. RUTH LANE, THE COMPLEXITY OF SELF GOVERNMENT: POLITICS FROM THE BOTTOM 
UP 21 (2017). 
132. Id.  For extensive applications to various models concerning morality and cooperation,
see ALEXANDER, supra note 99, at 25–100. 
133. See ROBERT BOYD & PETER J. RICHERSON, THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF
CULTURES 36, 38, 229, 380 (2005); see also T.J.H. Morgan et al., The Evolutionary Basis 
of Human Social Learning, 279 PROC. ROYAL SOC’Y B 653, 653–54, 659–60 (2011). For 
an accessible treatment, see JOSEPH HENRICH, THE SECRET OF OUR SUCCESS: HOW 
CULTURE IS DRIVING HUMAN EVOLUTION, DOMESTICATING OUR SPECIES, AND MAKING US 
SMARTER 11–13 (2016). 
134. See L. Rendell et al., Why Copy Others? Insights from the Social Learning 
Strategies Tournament, 328 SCIENCE 208, 208–13 (2010), https://science.sciencemag.org/ 
content/328/5975/208 [https://perma.cc/L537-3YD9].
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is the thing done around here, or the most successful.135  Whereas intelligent
primates such as chimps tend to figure out problems for themselves, human 
infants have a much stronger tendency to simply copy what they observe, 
copying “stupid” acts that the chimp sees as pointless.136  But by copying 
so much, we learn a great deal from others. 
Our tendency to copy prestigious people, those who do well, and the 
majority, has two important implications for complexity.  For one, it helps 
explain the stability of the social rules that structure social systems.137 
Although, since Rawls, many political philosophers have been obsessed
by the worry that just societies might not be stable;138 our basic social rules
and norms tend to be stable since we are prone to do what others do.  Even 
when norms change, it is of often because most are following a few 
trendsetters.139  Secondly, because we tend to imitate those who seem prestigious 
or successful, the effects of heterogeneity are dampened.140  In the social 
game of follow-the-prestigious-or-successful-or-majority, uniformity can 
spread throughout a diverse society.141  Summing up both points, Laland
observes that both norms and fashions are characteristic of humans alone.142 
This by no means shows that our social orders are not highly complex, but
it does help them avoid chaos and spend more of their time at functional 
states.143 
135. Id.
136. Josep Call, Malinda Carpenter & Michael Tomasello, Copying Results and Copying 
Actions in the Process of Social Learning: Chimpanzees (Pan Troglodytes) and Human 
Children (Homo Sapiens), 8 ANIMAL COGNITION 151, 160 (2005); Victoria Horner & 
Andrew Whiten, Causal Knowledge and Imitation/Emulation Switching in Chimpanzees 
(Pan Troglodytes) and Children (Homo Sapiens), 8 ANIMAL COGNITION 164, 177 (2005). 
137. See generally Richard Durrett & Simon A. Levin, Can Stable Social Groups Be 
Maintained by Homophilous Imitation Alone?, 57 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 267 (2005). 
138. See RAWLS, supra note 49, at 140–41.  This is not to say that the problem is trivial,
only that it is not nearly so daunting as game theoretic approaches would seem to indicate. 
139. See generally  CRISTINA BICCHIERI, NORMS IN THE WILD: HOW TO DIAGNOSE,
MEASURE, AND CHANGE SOCIAL NORMS ch. 5 (2017).  Cass R. Sunstein refers to these 
trendsetters as “norm entrepreneurs.”  See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, HOW CHANGE HAPPENS 
273 (2019).  This, perhaps, underplays the importance of imitation. 
140. See Yarbrough, supra note 134. 
141. See id.
 142. KEVIN N. LALAND, DARWIN’S UNFINISHED SYMPHONY: HOW CULTURE MADE 
THE HUMAN MIND 6 (2017). 
143.  Complexity is often understood as existing between simple order, à la Hobbes, 
and chaos.  See M. MITCHELL WALDROP, COMPLEXITY: THE EMERGING SCIENCE AT THE EDGE 
OF ORDER AND CHAOS 234–35 (1992). 
994
GAUS_56-4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/6/2019 10:58 AM      
 






















[VOL. 56:  967, 2019] Democratic Self-Governance 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
D. Self-Governance in CAS1 and CAS2 Systems 
A third alternative, in addition to CAS1 and CAS2 systems,144 is self-
governance. Jenann Ismael writes: 
These are systems in which at least some organized activity is the result of a 
centralized process that involves the sharing of information and the formation of
an overall plan and deliberate coordination of joint activity.  Self-governance 
contrasts with pure self-organization. In a purely self-organizing system, all
behavior is emergent from the aggregated activity of components, each doing its 
own thing.  The coupling among components can generate the appearance of
coordination, but there is not really any pooling of information and centralized
control of activity.  In a self-governing system, by contrast, at least some of the 
information distributed throughout the systems is collected, synthesized, and 
used to fuel a decision procedure that plays a role in guiding the system’s 
behavior.145 
Self-governance functions alongside the other mechanisms of system 
functionality, the macro-selection of CAS1 and the self-organization of
CAS2.146  No plausible analysis of complex systems would hold that the
entire system can be regulated by a central controller.  The critical claim 
made by advocates of complex system self-governance, such as Ismael, is 
that, in addition to the bottom-up forces of self-organization, there occurs 
a top-down direction of the entire system.147  The self-governance center
aggregates information from the lower-levels of the system and uses that 
information to make decisions that guide system behavior, the emergent
order, and perhaps, can change system parameters so that it functions in 
the desired way.148 
Strong self-governance appears in tension with strong self-organization,
which is maintained by agent-level adaptations and dispersed information.149 
Self-organized complex systems depend on ongoing numerous micro-
adjustments in the reflexive decisions of each agent.150  Because the system 
is in a state of constant flux, and its functionality is produced via these ongoing 
reflexive micro-decisions, it is not obvious to what extent a central information 
processor can guide the system along a desired path without interfering with 
144. See supra Sections IV.B, IV.C.
145.  ISMAEL, supra note 98, at 19–20. 
146.  See id. at 24–25. 
147.  See id. at 32–34. 
148.  See id. at 33–34. 
149.  See id. at 29. 
150.  See id. at 29–31. 
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the freedom of the individuals to reflexively adjust.  As Adam Smith, certainly
a CAS2 theorist, stressed in the Theory of Moral Sentiments, “in the great
chessboard of human society, every single piece has a principle of motion
of its own, altogether different from that which the legislature might choose 
to impress upon it.”151 
In contrast, in a macro-selection account, the entire complex system was
selected because it was, among the options, a good adaptive solution to past
environmental challenges.152  And this could well include a complex
system that had just the correct level of self-governance to promote systemic 
functionality.  Ismael’s thesis that self-governance is critical to individual 
human beings is consistent with the entire human complex system, including 
a certain level of self-governance, being the best solution to past adaptive 
challenges.153 We may not know why or how this level of self-governance 
has come to be or even why it is functional, but that is often the case with 
an evolutionary phenomenon. 
Whereas self-organized systems depend on allowing individuals large
degrees of freedom to reflexively “do their own thing” in responding to 
the decisions of others, macro-selected systems impose strong constraints 
on the freedom of the parts.154  On a multilevel selection account, the higher-
level selection inherently restrains lower-level, individual selection.155  There
is no point to higher-level selection if it does not.  Critical to the integrity
of an organism, for example, is restricting the freedom of parts to go their
own way—a cancer cell is precisely a part that has broken free of these
restraints, and because of this threatens ultimate system collapse.156  We
might say, in a rough and ready way, that restricting individual decisions 
in order to secure system wide functionality is precisely what macro-selection 
accomplishes; thus, extensive instructions by the governor need not be at
odds with the degree of freedom required for system maintenance.  Not 
too surprisingly, in the history of social theory this type of social order
typically has been identified with the idea of “social organisms”157 and a
151. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 234, 381 (1976). 
152.  See ISMAEL, supra note 98, at 37–38. 
153. See id. at 38. 
154. See id. at 33–34. 
155. See id.
 156. Trupti Shirole, How Cancer Cells Break Free the Physical Constraints on Growth 
and Spread, CANCER NEWS (Jan. 9, 2017, 11:15 PM), https://www.medindia.net/news/ 
how-cancer-cells-break-free-the-physical-constraints-on-growth-and-spread-166849-1.htm
[https://perma.cc/76AP-L2SN].
157. Interestingly, this idea has been revived in current theories of social evolution,
which often stress group-level selection.  Joseph Henrich explicitly compares individual cells 
in an organism to individuals in the evolving “superorganisms” of our societies. HENRICH, 
supra note 133, at 318. 
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morality of “my station and its duties.”158 Leaving aside this rather dubious
normative basis for self-governance, because strong macro-selection looks 
implausible today,159 I henceforth shall focus on self-governance in self-
organized complex systems, CAS2, a far more puzzling issue. 
V. IS DEMOCRATIC SELF-GOVERNANCE POSSIBLE? 
A. From Democratic Decision-Making to Self-Governance 
In his recent Securities Against Misrule, Jon Elster is acutely aware of
the difficulties posed by social complexity.160  In the end, he seems to 
accept that we can achieve little in the way of effective self-governance.161 
Secure fairness, guard against bias, try to utilize whatever intelligence there 
is, and after that “we have to let the chips fall where they may.”162  Essentially, 
self-governance is abandoned for fair proceduralism.  We make fair decisions, 
though we cannot be said to truly govern our social order—we cannot reliably 
improve our order of actions.  We can hold elections and make decisions; 
we can do things, and maybe even convince ourselves that we know what 
we are doing, but we will not really be governing our society.  What is 
required for self-governance, as Ismael stressed, is a “decision procedure 
that plays a role in guiding the system’s behavior” rather than simply
modifying its structure.163 
Let us, then, distinguish centralized decision making from centralized
self-governance. Centralized decision making in system S occurs when there
is a centralized decision procedure that can reliably change the rules, laws,
and institutions structuring S, or as a Rawlsian might say, the basic structure
of S;164 S’s centralized decision-making is democratic when it sufficiently 
conforms to the principles and procedures of democracy.  But that S possesses 
a centralized decision-making procedure does not imply that those operating 
the procedure can change the overall system to move it closer to a desired 
158. F.H. BRADLEY, My Station and Its Duties, in ETHICAL STUDIES 160, 161–62 (2d 
ed. 1988). 
159. See supra Section IV.B. 
160. JON ELSTER, SECURITIES AGAINST MISRULE: JURIES, ASSEMBLIES, ELECTIONS 3– 
5 (2013).
161. Id. at 286–87. 
162.  Id. at 1–2, 281. 
163. ISMAEL, supra note 98, at 20. 
164. See RAWLS, supra note 49, at 257–58. 
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state.165  To employ Hayek’s idea of an emergent order of actions,166 self-
governance requires that the decision maker reliably observes the current 
order of actions O, forms a judgment that O* would be a superior order, 
and makes a decision that reliably enhances the probability that S will 
move closer to O*.167  This requires both “cognitive” and “manipulative”
functions.168 As Beinhocker puts it, “If I perceive state A (cognitive function)
and take action X (manipulative function) then state B will result, bringing
me closer to (or farther from) my goal G.”169  If a centralized decision-making
procedure does that, it is also self-governing.  Complexity, then, constitutes a 
barrier in moving from centralized decision-making, which can reliably 
change the underlying structure, to self-governance, which reliably induces 
changes in the justice, welfare levels, and efficiency of emergent outcome 
of the structure.170  We can, as it were, fiddle with the genes; the problem
is whether we can improve the emergent phenotype in a reliable way.  Our 
question, then, is whether Elster’s proposal to focus on making the decision 
procedure democratic and fair171 is all we really can do, and after that we
can only let the chips fall where they may. 
B. Centralized Democratic Reflective Self-Governance 
Jack Knight and James Johnson recently have developed a powerful case
for a centralized form of democratic self-government in heterogenous social
systems.172  To their great credit, Knight and Johnson are sensitive to the
importance of accounting for the heterogeneity and dispersed information 
characteristic of complex systems.173  Moreover, they rightly analyze
contemporary socio-economic orders as composed of diverse interacting 
institutions at different levels174—there is no illusion of an overall democratic
central controller, simply selecting various preferred social states and planning 
society to secure them.  Rather, on their view the task of centralized democratic 
decision-making is a reflexive monitoring of other social institutions, and 
165. See id. at 263. 
166. See supra Section III.B.
 167. See RAWLS, supra note 49, at 263–64. 
168. George Soros, Fallibility, Reflexivity, and the Human Uncertainty Principle, 20
J. ECON. METHODOLOGY 309, 311 (2013). 
169. Beinhocker, supra note 6, at 332. 
170. I shall focus on the idea of self-governance as guiding the emergent order,
though any attempt to simultaneously control a significant set of important macro variables 
would lead to similar problems, as Figure 4 indicated.  See supra fig.4.
171. ELSTER, supra note 160, at 5. 
172. See generally JACK KNIGHT & JAMES JOHNSON, THE PRIORITY OF DEMOCRACY:
POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM (2011).
173. Id. at 42. 
174. Id. at 13–14. 
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itself, with an eye to improving the social order.175  Consistent with Ismael’s
understanding of self-governance in complex systems, they see centralized 
democratic decision-making as aggregating information dispersed throughout 
the system to evaluate the system’s functioning and employing the information 
to “experimentally” reform it in socially desirable ways.176  The tasks of 
centralized democratic decision-making are “(1) coordinating effective
institutional experimentation, (2) monitoring and assessing effective institutional
performance for the range of institutions available in any society, and, most
importantly, (3) monitoring and assessing it own ongoing performance.”177 
In addition to the cognitive functions of (2) and (3), the democratic self-
governor must have a sufficiently strong manipulative ability to make 
experimental adjustments that have a significant likelihood of producing 
reform in the desired direction.178  The stress on institutional experimentation 
is fundamental to their essentially pragmatic approach: democratic self-
governance does not simply select a path to be followed, but is an ongoing 
process of monitoring, evaluating, and “experimenting” to discover better 
institutional arrangements that yield a better social results.179  To be sure, 
as pragmatists, they hold back form specifying these desired social results
—their determination is also a matter of democratic self-reflective judgment.180 
But whatever it is, the democratic public must exercise not only the cognitive 
but also the manipulative function.  Such centralized reflexive capability 
is held to give democratic decision-making a priority over all forms of 
decentralized self-organization.181 
175. Id. at 16–17. 
176. Id. at 62–63. 
177. Id. at 17. 
178. There are times when they seem to draw back from advocating any form of
“collective” self-governance, focusing instead simply on democracy as a way to manage 
disputes. Id. at 20.  But it is, I think, clear that their worry here is identifying independent
goals, rather than those goals coming out of the democratic process itself.  Without any
goal-based decisions, their core idea of experimentation is unmotivated.  And unless the 
goals aim at social improvements, rather than just institutional change, it would not be a
form of self-governance. 
179. Id. at 134–35. 
180. See id. at 170. 
181. They also hold that self-organized, CAS2, systems cannot ensure society-wide
coordination, id. at 107–08, and thus centralized self-governance is required to ensure the 
normative acceptability of the overall system.  Cf. supra Section IV.B (discussing Wilson’s 
view). 
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Knight and Johnson’s proposal182 is, in my view, by far the most
sophisticated attempt to defend the priority of centralized democratic self-
government in heterogenous systems with dispersed information.  It certainly
merits closer examination than I can give it here.  Nevertheless, it is hard 
not to conclude that it too heavily taxes both the (i) cognitive and (ii) 
manipulative capacities of reflexive self-government.183 
In the spirit of pragmatism, Dewey observed that each person knows 
best “where the shoe pinches.”184  Following Dewey, Knight and Johnson
view democracy as a method of gathering and aggregating the dispersed 
information about how well the system is functioning, that is, how many 
toes are being pinched.185  However, as we have seen, in complex systems
the dynamics underlying why one’s toes are being pinched may be intimately 
related to why other things are going well—perhaps given the limits on 
current technology, shoes with great arch support pinch, and we remain 
ignorant of the critical fact that only because one’s shoe pinches, one does 
not have crippling backaches.  Thus, aggregating complaints about pinched 
toes may well be entirely misleading about how well the system is doing.  
Less homely, in a complex system we often only know the surface, or 
immediate, effects of our rules, norms, and institutions: since we cannot 
know the invisible effects, reports of the felt problems do not give much 
insight into system performance.  The functioning’s of our norms, practices, 
and institutions are, as Henrich says, often “causally opaque—an individual 
cannot readily infer their functions, interrelationships, or importance,” and 
so “intuitions and personal experiences can lead one astray.”186  If voters
are in the dark that the other side of what they are unhappy about is that it 
satisfies a need, then complaints about what they are unhappy about do not 
provide much information about how well the system is doing. 
Presumably, at this juncture, an advocate of centralized reflexive democracy 
would stress the reflexive, incremental, and “experimental” nature of 
democratic interventions.  As the system discovers that it has eliminated 
arch support shoes, it can better learn about its own performance, which it 
just made things worse, not better.187 Successful interventions are not once
and for all determinations, but ongoing iterative experiments in improving 
our social system.188  Now to be sure, an iterative “experimental” procedure
does not require hitting the correct answer at one go; it does, though, require 
182. See KNIGHT & JOHNSON, supra note 172, at x. 
183. See id. at 98, 104; see also supra Section IV.A.
 184. JOHN DEWEY, INTELLIGENCE IN THE MODERN WORLD: JOHN DEWEY’S PHILOSOPHY
402 (Joseph Ratner ed., 1939). 
185. See KNIGHT & JOHNSON, supra note 172, at 104. 
186. HENRICH, supra note 133, at 99–100. 
187. See KNIGHT & JOHNSON, supra note 172, at 98. 
188. See id.
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that after an intervention the governor reliably knows, as it were, in what 
direction to move next.189  To use a cybernetic example, if the governor 
has decided that it is too cold in a room, it must reliably know whether 
this should lead to turning the heat up or down.190  In a simple system such 
as Figure 7, this will be easy. 
FIGURE 7: A SYSTEM GROUNDING INCREMENTAL SOCIAL CHANGE
Note that here one does not have to know precisely where one will end
up.  Once one knows the direction of improvement, turning the heater up
at social world three, one can keep evaluating the outcome and proceeding
in the same direction until movement in that direction is no longer an
improvement; one then has reached the optimum. Here, incremental social
improvement really is truly incremental and improving, since each move 
produces a better result until no better is possible.  But as the experiment
gets nearer to a highly complex system, the governor is unclear whether the 
system is adequately functioning well.  Thus, the cognitive capacity seems
overwhelmed.  And then there is the matter of action: Move right or left? 
The manipulation capacity is also lacking: even if we are not happy with 
the current system, we do not, as it were, know which way to turn the dial. 
189. See id.
 190. PAUL LEWIS, PURPOSEFUL BEHAVIOUR, EXPECTATIONS, AND THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL
JUSTICE: THE INFLUENCE OF CYBERNETICS ON THE THOUGHT OF F.A. HAYEK 5 (2016), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2790169 [https://perma.cc/2SPC-ZXLP]. 
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Both these problems—with the cognitive and manipulation functions—
are greatly aggravated by the fact that the democratic self-governor is just 
one reflexive agent in a world of reflexive agents.191  All agents are reflexively 
responding to each other and to the governor as the governor seeks to
reflexively respond to them.192  As the centralized self-governor acts by
choosing X, changing rules and institutions in current state S, the constituent 
agents reflexively respond to that very institutional change, bringing about 
S*. But X may no longer be appropriate against this new background, so 
the centralized self-governor responds with X*, to which other agents
reflexively respond in myriad and unpredictable ways, making X* also 
inappropriate. The rugged landscape discussed in Part II is thus constantly 
shifting as the democratic self-governor seeks to traverse it. 
C. Democratic Governance in a Polycentric Order 
It certainly looks as if, contrary to their core claim, Knight and Johnson’s
reflexive learning model of centralized democratic self-governance strains
under great diversity.193  To effectively apply it, diversity and complexity
must be reduced.  The key to doing so, I believe, is implicit in their Deweyan 
focus on problem-solving.194  Pursuing this insight has been the great 
contribution of Paul Dragos Aligica.195  One of the lessons we have learned
from the work of Elinor and Vincent Ostrom is that effective joint action 
is most apt to arise when a group of people face what I shall call a pressing 
problem solving context.196  For example, we face the degradation of a
common pool resource and seek to do something about it.  In problem-solving 
contexts, diversity is reduced because people share (i) a common perception 
of a problem to be solved, (ii) an agreement that a range of policies constitute 
plausible solutions to the problem, and (iii) a belief that most any of these 
solutions would be preferable to leaving the problem unresolved.197  If crime 
is rising in my neighborhood, my focus is on solving that problem; to a
significant extent, many of my other diverse aims and goals are bracketed; 
a crime fighting community becomes a simpler, less heterogenous community, 
191. See Elinor Ostrom & Vincent Ostrom, The Quest for Meaning in Public Choice,
in CHOICE, RULES AND COLLECTIVE ACTION: THE OSTROMS ON THE STUDY OF INSTITUTIONS 
AND GOVERNANCE, supra note 21, at 61, 75. 
192. See id.
 193. KNIGHT & JOHNSON, supra note 172, at 43. 
194. See id. at 36; cf. DEWEY, supra note 63.
 195. See, e.g., PAUL DRAGOS ALIGICA, PUBLIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP, CITIZENSHIP, AND 
SELF-GOVERNANCE (2019); PAUL DRAGOS ALIGICA, PETER J. BOETTKE & VLAD TARKO, 
PUBLIC GOVERNANCE AND THE CLASSICAL-LIBERAL PERSPECTIVE (2019).
196. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS 
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 6 (1990).
197. See id.
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thus reducing the complexity of the public policy problem.  Our problem 
becomes closer to Figure 3, or even Figure 2, above.
When the problem is, in addition, pressing, most individuals in group
G believe that solving the problem is sufficiently important that other
unintended consequences are not weighty as far as they are concerned.198 
Given the inevitable interconnectivity of activities in a complex system,
when the group solves their pressing collective action problem, there are
bound to be other effects, both known and unknown.199 But when the problem
is pressing, the participants will tolerate a significant range of unintended 
consequences in order to effectively solve the problem.200 To be sure, insofar 
as these can be anticipated, they will enter into the problem-solving deliberations, 
but the critical point is that when everyone in group G sees a collective 
action problem as pressing, the system becomes virtually simpler.  Heterogeneity 
is reduced because members of G share similar goals and the system’s 
interconnections can be bracketed by the group member because members 
of G do not care much about them.201 
The key to the Ostrom-inspired polycentric approach is to, as far as 
possible, allow problem-solving groups to organize themselves in such a
way that the level of governance approaches the optimal public for that 
problem: just large enough to encompass the stakeholders who perceive a 
pressing common problem and whose participation is essential to solve 
the problem.202  Note that there is limitation on the scope of the aims of
governance: to adequately solve perceived common problems—not, say, 
to guide the overall system along a preferred trajectory of social improvement.203 
In the polycentric vision, diverse problem-solving institutions, state as well 
as nonstate, self-organize in forming rule-based reflexive efforts to solve
shared, pressing problems.204  Such polycentricity has five major attractions:
(i) Because the self-governing unit is focused on a smaller set of problems
and common perceptions of solutions, its reflexive monitoring task is 
much easier.  We saw in Sections II.A and V.B that in a reflexive system, 
198. See id. at 38–39. 
199. See id. at 38.
 200. See ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY 87 (2005).
201.  See id. at 87–88. 
202. See id. at 260–61. 
203. See id. at 261–62. 
204. See Vincent Ostrom, Polycentricity: The Structural Basis of Self-Governing
Systems, in CHOICE, RULES AND COLLECTIVE ACTION, supra note 21, at 45, 47; see also
PAUL DRAGOS ALIGICA, INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY: THE OSTROMS
AND BEYOND 49 (2014). 
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each participant reflexively responds to the judgments of the self-governor, 
greatly complicating the problem of governing the system.  When the self-
governor is solving shared pressing problems of the group, anticipating 
the reflexive responses to the self-governor’s decisions is simplified.  Note 
here that when self-government covers a large and diverse population such
that it seeks to solve problems that many participants do not see as problems, 
this benefit of polycentricity is lost.205  The governor is then no longer
 
 
able to anticipate their reflexive response to its decisions since they do not 
share its problem-solving orientation.
(ii) As far as possible, the polycentric program encourages duplication 
and competition among different polycentric problem-solving institutions,
which provides some approximation of the ideal of “experimenting” with 
diverse institutional designs to see which institutional schemes are more
functional and efficient.206 
(iii) Polycentric institutions are, in an important sense, themselves part 
of social self-organization.207 As we see in Elinor Ostrom’s work, they often 
arise within a self-organized network of relations; they certainly are not 
top-down governance imposed on the self-organized system.208  They form
out of the self-organized networks and common perceptions of inadequacies 
in them.209  Polycentric systems thus provide space for norm exploration; 
groups experiencing perceived unsolved, or badly solved, collective action
problems seek to resolve them within the context of their current social 
networks.210 
(iv) The social conflict that heterogeneity can engender is transformed
in problem-solving contexts into a more cooperative inquiry looking for
better solutions.211  Once politics is conceived in terms of inquiry into the
best solutions to common problem, we can draw on results such as Scott 
Page’s, which show how diverse groups possess enhanced problem-solving
capabilities.212 It is important that Page’s diversity theorems are about
205. See Ostrom, supra note 204, at 48. 
206. See Vincent Ostrom, Charles M. Tiebout & Robert Warren, The Organization
of Government in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Enquiry, 55 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 831, 
838 (1961); supra Section III.B.  For a philosophical analysis, see generally JULIAN F. MÜLLER, 
POLITICAL PLURALISM, DISAGREEMENT AND JUSTICE: THE CASE FOR POLYCENTRIC DEMOCRACY 
(2019).
207. See OSTROM, supra note 196, at 133–35; see also supra Section IV.C.
 208. See OSTROM, supra note 196, at 133–35; see also LANE, supra note 131, at 68– 
69. 
209. See OSTROM, supra note 196, at 133–35. 
210. See COLANDER & KUPERS, supra note 18, at 28, 181. 
211. See Lu Hong & Scott E. Page, Problem Solving by Heterogeneous Agents, 97
J. ECON. THEORY 123, 153 (2001). 
212. See, e.g., SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIVERSITY BONUS: HOW GREAT TEAMS PAY OFF
IN THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 2 (2017); Lu Hong & Scott E. Page, Groups of Diverse 
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problem-solving contexts: when we have identified a common problem and 
have agreed on what would be a good solution, then Hong-Page dynamics 
can get going.213 Because democratic polycentric citizenship is about
collective problem-solving, the stage is set for diversity to assist in social 
searches for better solutions.214  Pressing collective action problems thus
have something of the perfect mix of homogeneity and heterogeneity: an
agreement on the problem; its importance; and a general concurrence on 
what would constitute good solutions with heterogeneity of perspectives, 
tool kits, and cognitive resources, so that the solution space can be more
adequately explored.
(v) Because polycentric self-organization does not commence with a 
certain predefined group, such as a national state, it can adjust its boundaries 
to encompass all those who share the pressing problem orientation.215 Rather
than commencing with a preferred unit, which is apt to be highly diverse 
and complex, as the focus for all policy, different publics form at different 
levels in response to various collective action problems; the boundaries of 
the public seek to track the simplification of the social problem induced 
by the pressing problem orientation, which also enhances the ability to 
actually solve the problem.216  It is crucial that polycentrism is not understood
in terms of the autonomy of local or small communities. For any given
problem, the proper size of the democratic self-governing public ranges 
from the neighborhood to the globe.217 
Polycentricity’s partial reconciliation of self-organization and self-governance 
leads, on Aligica’s analysis, to a revised conception of democratic citizenship.218 
Especially prominent in his account is the task of the “public entrepreneur,” 
who takes the leading role identifying and showing the importance of potential 
collective problem-solving contexts.219  That a group confronts a collective
action problem does not mean that the problem is obvious or is recognized 
as pressing.  The public entrepreneur takes a leading role in mobilizing 
Problem Solvers Can Outperform Groups of High-Ability Problem Solvers, 101 PROC.
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. AM. 16,385, 16,385 (2004); Hong & Page, supra note 211, at 154. 
213. See PAGE, supra note 212, at 2–3. 
214. See generally Gerald Gaus, The Complexity of a Diverse Moral Order, 16 GEO.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y (SPECIAL ISSUE) 645 (2018). 
215. See OSTROM, supra note 200, at 260–61. 
216.  See id. at 261. 
217. See id.
 218. See ALIGICA, supra note 195, at 19–20. 
219.  See id. at 41. 
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recognition of the problem and ways to solve it, which includes providing
the contexts for discussion and exchange of information.220 
Alas, polycentric problem-solving publics are no panacea—there are no
panaceas in this area.  I have stressed that when a group sees a pressing
problem, they tolerate a great deal of unforeseen consequences in pursuit
of a solution to their pressing problem, thus practically reducing the relevance
of interconnections.221  As far as they are concerned, it is pretty simple to 
evaluate whether their self-governance secures its goals: it does if it 
adequately solves and manages the pressing collective action problem.  
But the tight coupling that characterizes complex systems still exists, and 
those who do not share the problem-solving perspective will be far more 
sensitive to the often unpredictable effects of their neighbor’s solutions to 
their collective action problems.  Sometimes, these effects will be cognized, 
other times they will be unseen, but for all that very real.  Put in the familiar 
terms of economics, G’s solution to its collective action problem can 
impose externalities on others.  This problem is not obviated by point v 
above: even when ensuring the problem-solving group includes all those 
with a pressing interest in solving the problem, others, who do not share 
the problem orientation, can nevertheless be affected by G’s rules, and 
behaviors, and impacts.  There is no algorithm about the proper response.  
Sometimes, the effects of G’s behaviors are simply exogenous variables 
that another group responds to in solving its own collective action problems— 
your solution is often simply part of my problem.  At other times, the 
effects are sufficiently obvious and serious that an overarching system of 
rules must regulate the externalities or adjudicate conflicts.222  It is critical, 
however, not to see this encompassing framework as itself a high order 
project in self-governance.  Rather, it constitutes a framework of constraints, 
rights, and powers that define the limits of each subgroup’s exercises in 
self-government. It is to this important framework that I now turn. 
VI. THE DEONTIC FRAMEWORK
A. “Purpose-Independent” Rules 
We should not become so enamored with the resources of polycentricity 
for democratic self-governance that we suppose it can be the sole form of 
social regulation in complex systems.  Self-governing problem-solving
groups arise within an overall framework of rules specifying the rights of 
220. See id. at 42 (the entrepreneur can build on different preferences for public
goods, helping to show how diversity of preferences can cause convergence on outcomes, 
not simply divergence). 
221. See supra Section V.C. 
222. See ALIGICA, supra note 204, at 58. 
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citizens and prohibiting various forms of harmful externalities. Pace
Rousseau, self-governance is not a sovereign, supreme locus of social
regulation;223 it occurs within an overall systems of norms, moral rules,
and laws that both empower and delimit the jurisdictions of self-governing
publics and so control externalities.224  And again, pace Rousseau, these
rules cannot be understood as themselves efforts at a higher-level self-
government.225  Such rules do not govern the system in the sense of guiding 
it toward preferred social states: they structure the ways that self-organization
takes place.  In this sense, they are what Hayek called “purpose-independent 
rules.”226  They are purpose-independent not because we do not intentionally 
follow them to avoid certain forms of prohibited conduct, but because they
are not followed as a means to securing more favored social states as we
do not know what social states they will produce, and some may have
grave problems.227 
To see why this is so, we must remember that the moral upshot of any
rule depends not simply on the degree of conformity to the rule’s deontic 
imperatives but on how heterogenous reflexive agents react to the rule and 
the morally relevant options they take.228  Rules, after all, seldom mandate
specific actions: they generally permit and prohibit actions.229  Consider a
moral rule that prohibits religious arguments in the democratic deliberations 
223. See generally JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Of the Social Contract, in THE SOCIAL
CONTRACT AND OTHER LATER POLITICAL WRITINGS 39, 41–56 (Victor Gourevitch ed. & 
trans., 1997). 
224. As I have pointed out elsewhere, by specifying jurisdictions, complexity is 
reduced, since many of the externalities of one’s actions within one’s jurisdiction—say, 
what God one worships—are considered normatively irrelevantas if they did not exist.  
See generally GAUS, supra note 22, at 198–202.  We might call this “normatively-induced 
decomposability.” 
225. See generally ROUSSEAU, supra note 223, at 42–57. 
226. 1 HAYEK, supra note 78, at 85. 
227. See id. at 88. 
228. According to Hayek:
It is important always to remember that a rule of conduct will never by itself
be a sufficient cause of action but that the impulse for actions of a certain kind
will always come either from a particular external stimulus or from an internal
drive (and usually from a combination of both), and that the rules of conduct will 
always act only as a restraint on actions induced by other causes. 
HAYEK, supra note 33, at 68–69. 
229. See Gerald Gaus & Shaun Nichols, Moral Learning in the Open Society: The 
Theory and Practice of Natural Liberty, 34 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 79, 89 (2017). 
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about basic justice.230  Suppose that societies S1, S2, and S3 all fully comply 
with the rule. In S1 many are religious citizens, and while they comply, their
moral perspectives lead them to retreat from the public sphere, where they 
cannot appeal to what they consider the fundamental basis of their convictions, 
leaving political matters to their secular brethren.  In S2, religious people tend
to have a much stronger devotion to civic engagement and participate 
actively in political debate while complying, though perhaps with some 
misgivings, with this duty.  In S3, the secular citizens, interpreting this moral
duty as confirming their conviction that religious arguments are bogus and 
are unworthy of admittance into public debate—their scientific arguments 
are admissible, after all—become even more dismissive of religious 
comprehensive doctrines.  All three societies perfectly comply; the emerging 
moral relations between citizens are vastly different. 
B. Deontic Rules in Complex Adaptive Systems
In Section IV.A, I stressed that it is far from automatic that complex
systems will be functional or adaptive.231 We are thus pressed to ask: what
is the relation between the deontic framework and system functionality? 
Those—including, at least in some works, Hayek—who embrace macro- 
selection232 can invoke a rather comforting analysis: the “purpose-independent” 
rules of our basic framework have evolved as part of our overall society, 
and thus are, or at least have been, adaptive, though we do not know the 
causal basis of why this is so.233  These explanatory resources obviously 
are not available to a self-organization, CAS2, analysis.  CAS2 systems are 
self-organized, and that includes many of their basic norms and social 
rules.234  Individuals in CAS2 systems are constantly affirming the current 
social rules or exploring the personal consequences of defecting on them.
Some considerations incline towards acceptance: obeying rules is an entry
condition to participation in many social networks.  If one wishes to join
a group’s cooperative endeavor, one must sign on to certain rules.235  And,
230. Rawls, with a rather complex proviso, endorses this as a moral duty, see generally
RAWLS supra note 49, at 440–90. 
231. See supra Section IV.A. 
232. See supra Section IV.B. 
233. See 1 F.A. HAYEK, The Fatal Conceit, in THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF 
SOCIALISM 66, 74–76 (W.W. Bartley III ed., 1988); see also HENRICH, supra note 133, at 
145. But see 1 HAYEK, supra note 78, at 88.
234.  For models of such moral self-organization, see generally ALEXANDER, supra
note 99; Gerald Gaus, Self-Organizing Moral Systems: Beyond Social Contract Theory, 
17 POL. PHIL. & ECON. 119 (2018). 
235. Indeed, it may often be required that we accept these rules as objectively true. 
See generally Kyle Stanford, The Difference Between Ice Cream and Nazis: Moral Externalization 
and the Evolution of Human Cooperation, 41 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 1 (2018). 
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of course, both punishment for noncompliance and conformity bias support 
compliance.236 On the other hand, rules may limit one’s opportunity to pursue
important aims or conflict with one’s personal normative convictions.237 
Thus, some individuals are always probing and testing the rules.  As Hayek
observes: 
[I]t is, in fact, often desirable that the rules should be observed only in most 
instances and that the individual should be able to transgress them when it seems 
to him worthwhile to incur the odium this will cause. . . . It is this flexibility of 
voluntary rules which in the field of morals makes gradual evolution and spontaneous
growth possible, which allows further experience to lead to modifications and
improvements.238 
None of this guarantees that the self-organized moral rules are justified
to all or even to many: societies can get stuck in norm traps where all
follow norms of which all disapprove.239  Often norms can be changed
through a bottom-up approach,240 while at other times democratic legislation 
may be used in an attempt to induce normatively required change.241  It is 
inevitable that democratic decision-making, not, in this case, an act of self-
governance, will often be a form of what we might call “myopic morality,” 
or, less pejoratively, “deontology.”242  That is, democratic decision makers
may conclude that some forms of social interaction, for example, racial
discrimination, are inherently wrong and are to be prohibited and then, in
line with Elster, they let the chips fall where they may. To be sure, the
democratic decision maker may consider some immediate and highly
predictable proximate effects of a rule, but as we have seen, anything approaching
a sound judgment of its overall effects will be impossible.  The system will
then proceed to reflexively adjust to this new input, usually in surprising 
236. See supra Section IV.C. 
237. This raises the normative issue of public justification: do those living under a
rule view it as normativity acceptable?  See generally GAUS, supra note 115, at ch. V. 
238. F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 63 (1960). 
239. See CRISTINA BICCHIERI, THE GRAMMAR OF SOCIETY: THE NATURE AND DYNAMICS
OF SOCIAL NORMS 176–208 (2006); SUNSTEIN, supra note 139, at 4. 
 240. See BICCHIERI, supra note 139, at 114–15. 
241.  This is not a simple task.  In a reflexive system, changing a law is by no means 
equivalent to changing behavior. For an in-depth survey concerning growth, development, 
and policy implications, see WORLD BANK GRP., WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2017:
GOVERNANCE AND THE LAW (2017), https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/wdr2017
[https://perma.cc/LK86-3KJZ].
242. See generally Gerald F. Gaus, Social Complexity and Evolved Moral Principles, 
in LIBERALISM, CONSERVATISM, AND HAYEK’S IDEA OF SPONTANEOUS ORDER 149 (Louis 
Hunt & Peter McNamara ed., 2007). 
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ways.  For the CAS2 theorist, we can have no assurance that large parts of 
deontic framework are not causing more problems than they solve. 
C. The Liberal Principles of Self-Organization 
Deontic moral and social rules are thus necessary in social systems;
there must be rules to structure self-organization—including regulating the 
externalities of various self-governing communities—in ways that conform 
to the public’s moral convictions.  Of course, we should be aware that as 
we multiply such rules, the adaptability of the system may be compromised.  
As Ismael reminds us in Section III.D, letting individuals do their own 
thing is the key to CAS2 functionality.243 
However, as we learn more about the functioning of complex social and
moral systems, we obtain theoretical knowledge of features of the deontic 
framework that facilitate self-organization.  In this vein, Hayek argued 
that the principle of liberty was firmly grounded in the need of individuals 
in complex systems to effectively and reflexively adjust their behavior:
“[A] state in which each can use his knowledge for his [own] purposes.”244 
Freedom and markets, he insisted, were first and foremost ways for
individuals to successfully coordinate their heterogenous plans.245  We are
constantly tempted, Hayek says, to limit this freedom in the pursuit of 
desired collective outcomes, but these outcomes are most uncertain, and 
it is only the principle of freedom that allows the constant adjustments on 
which a complex order depends.246  He thus makes what prima facie appears
as a startling claim for one who stresses uncertainty and complexity in
social life: we should be dogmatic in our defense of liberal principles.247 
And Shaun Nichols and I have argued that rules stated as prohibitions—
what Adam Smith called the “negative” aspect of justice248—are more
effective in encouraging innovation and exploration than a rule system 
based on permissions.249  We are by no means in the dark about the types
of deontic rules that facilitate the coordination of different plans and interests 
in a diverse society and so bolster the functionality of our CAS2 system.  
Here, we have something between self-governance and deontic imperatives— 
243. See supra Section IV.D. 
244. 1 HAYEK, supra at 78, at 55–56.  See generally Mack, supra note 36. 
245. 1 HAYEK, supra note 78, at 56. 
246.  Id. 
247. Id. at 61. 
248. SMITH, supra note 151, at 160. 
249.  See Gaus & Nichols, supra note 229, at 96, 101. 
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rules that facilitate self-organization, the specifics of which cannot be
anticipated.250 
VII. CLOSING REMARKS ON DEMOCRATIC SELF-GOVERNMENT
A. The Fatal Democratic Conceit 
I have departed from Hayek’s pathbreaking analysis of complexity in 
important ways, most importantly regarding his strong reliance on macro-
evolution.251  The analysis has brought us to conclusions about democratic
self-governance much closer to those of the Ostroms than Hayek. Yet, 
my itinerary has paralleled his.  Much thinking about democracy starts 
with small group contexts in which the decision determines the resulting 
state of affairs.  It is then implicitly supposed that problems of scale are 
essentially linear: as the questions become more complex, more information 
and expertise is required, but scale does not fundamentally alter the basic 
dynamic.  This strong intuitive conviction—something approaching a 
certainty—that we can control our world is, to borrow from Hayek, a fatal 
conceit.252  It is a conceit because it not only wildly overestimates our 
intelligence and information but is blind to the intractability of the task of 
governing complex social orders.  And it is fatal because the conviction 
that democratic control is possible ultimately delegitimizes democratic 
self-governance. No form of self-governance could do what so many insist 
is not only possible, but required: to guide the order of actions to increasingly 
just states.253 When we ask the impossible of it, democracy is bound to
disappoint. 
B. A Coda on Rule by Experts 
Karl Popper famously criticized some of the towering figures in philosophy 
for their elitist rejection of a democratic, open society.254  Today, we are 
250. This seems more accurate than the claim that public policy, while it cannot control,
can tweak or shape the evolution of a complex order.  Shaping evolution is no mean feat.  
Cf. COLANDER & KUPERS, supra note 18, at 8, 59; Gowdy et al., supra note 99, at 327–50. 
251. See supra Section IV.B. 
252. 1 HAYEK, supra note 233, at 66. 
253.  On this, see generally GAUS, supra note 22, at chs. 1–2. 
254. This, of course, was the theme of his great The Open Society and Its Enemies.
See generally 2 K.R. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES: THE HIGH TIDE OF 
PROPHECY: HEGEL, MARX, AND THE AFTERMATH (4th ed. rev. 1963).  Philosophers are generally 
dismissive of this great work.  What a surprise. 
1011
GAUS_56-4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/6/2019 10:58 AM      
 
 
     
   
    
     
 




    
   
 





   
again witnessing a resurgence of those who propose, or at least seriously 
contemplate, the benefits of rule by experts. There may perhaps be something 
about the philosophic mind that all too easily leads it to turn its back on
democracy.  Not known for their intellectual modesty, philosophers are 
often convinced they have true knowledge of the right and the good, and
they are frustrated by the folk’s ignorance, that is, their contrary views.
And of course, as I noted at the outset, the folk often give less deference
to social scientific expertise. I have not set out here to defend democracy
over elitism, but to investigate what real, effective, democratic self-governance 
might look like.  However, as I hope is clear, just because the social systems
are so complex, rule by experts is deeply implausible.  Experts possess
neither the cognitive nor the manipulative capacities to govern a complex 
system. Indeed, I have argued that the condition for self-governance in
complex systems depends on the simplification of parts of the social system 
induced by some public’s recognition of a common pressing collective problem. 
The people themselves produce the conditions for self-governance.  The 
context for any real self-governance is thus inherently and necessarily
democratic: when a public converges on a common understanding of their 
pressing problem.255 
255. And then, as Page, Knight and Johnson, and Aligica have shown, the public can 
draw on their diversity of perspectives to better solve it than could a gaggle of experts.  
See supra Sections V.B, V.C. 
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